


EXHIBIT FF 3

VUSI BRUCE

KOLOANE





**JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF STATE CAPTURE,
CORRUPTION AND FRAUD IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR INCLUDING ORGANS OF STATE**

2nd floor, Hillside House
17 Empire Road,
Parktown
Johannesburg
2193
Tel: (010) 214 to 0651
Email:

inquiries@sastatecapture.org.za

Website: www.sastatecapture.org.za

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10.	The Appointment letter by the President
11.	Agreement between South Africa and Netherlands
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international relations & cooperation

Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Private Bag X152, PRETORIA, 0001 • OR Tambo Bld, 460 Soutpansberg Road, Rietondale, PRETORIA, 0084
Tel: +27 (0) 12 351 1000 • www.dirco.gov.za

Ambassador VB Koloane
Chief of State Protocol

Dear Ambassador Koloane

NOTIFICATION OF SUSPENSION

Reference is made to my letter, dated 2 May 2013, your response thereto, dated 6 May 2013, as well as to the preliminary interdepartmental investigation by Government into the matter.


I have thoroughly considered the representations you have made in your aforesaid letter and I have consequently decided to suspend you from duty with full emoluments with immediate effect pursuant to paragraph 2.7(2) of Chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook while the Department conducts its own internal investigation into the matter. Please note that the suspension is a precautionary measure and does not in any way constitute a judgment.

To avoid possible interference with the investigation or potential witnesses, you may not enter the premises of the Department during your period of suspension without my express prior authorisation. Should you require access to the Department, you are requested to contact me to obtain permission in that regard.

Yours sincerely


Ambassador JM Matjila
Director-General

Date: 23 May 2013

V.B. KOLOANE


Kgoro ya Tirišano le Tšhomišano ya Dinaga tša Boditšhabatšhaba • Lefapha la Dikamano le Tshebedisano Dinaheng tsa Matjhaba • Lefapha la Dikamano tsa Boditšhabatšhaba le Tirisano • UMnyango Wezobudlelwano Nokubambisana Bamazwe Namazwe • Liko Letebudlelwane Bemave kanye Nekusebentsana • ISebe lezobudlelwane neNisebenziswano yamZwe ngamaZwe • UmNyango weTjhebiswano nokuSebenzisana kweenTjhabatjhaba • Muhasho wa Vhushaka ha Dzitshakatshaka na Tshumisano • Ndzawulo ya Vuxaka bya Matlko ya Misava na Ntirhisano • Departement van Internasionale Betrekkinge en Samewerking





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27 June, 2013

Dear Amb. Bruce Koloane

ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT AND NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY HEARING IN TERMS OF CLAUSES 6 AND 7 OF THE DISCIPLINARY CODE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE CO-ORDINATING BARGAINING COUNCIL: RESOLUTION NO 1 OF 2003 AND PARAGRAPH 2 OF CHAPTER 7 OF THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT SERVICE HANDBOOK

1. You, Ambassador VB Koloane, employed by the Department of International Relations and Co-operations, therefore an Officer of the Public Service of South Africa and a member of the Senior Management Service, are hereby charged with misconduct in terms of Chapter 7 of the Senior Management Services Handbook, for the acts of misconduct as set out in this charge sheet.
2. The factors on which the allegations are founded, are similarly set out in charge sheet attached.
3. You are hereby invited to agree to a Pre-Arbitration dispute before an Arbitrator determined by the General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council ("GPSSBC").
4. The disciplinary hearing will be held at the Department of

Kgoro ya Tirisano le Tshomliso ya Dinaga tsa Boditshabats'haba • Lefapha la Dikamano le Tshebediso Dinaheng tsa Matjhaba • Lefapha la Dikamano tsa Boditshabats'haba le Tirisano • UMnyango Wezobudlelwano Nokubambisana Bamazwe Namazwe • Liliko Letebudlelwane Bemave kanye Nekusebents'haba • ISebe lezobudlelwane neNtsebenziswano yamZwe ngamaZwe • UmNyango weTjhebiswano nokuSebenzisana kweenTjhabatjhaba • Muhasho wa Vhushaka ha Dzitshakatshaka na Tshumisano • Ndzawulo ya Vuxaka bya Matiko ya Misava na Ntirhisano • Departement van Internasionale Betrekkinge en Samewerking

**International Relations and Cooperation, at Welcome Centre, OR
Tambo Building, Pretoria on 02 July 2013, at 09:00.**

5. If you do not attend and cannot give reasonable grounds for failing to attend, the hearing will proceed in your absence.
6. You are furthermore, entitled to be represented by either a fellow employee or by a trade union of your choice.
7. You may give evidence to the hearing in the form of documents or through witnesses. You will be entitled to question any witness introduced by the employer.
8. If the enquiry holds that you are guilty of misconduct, you may present any relevant circumstances in determining the disciplinary sanction.
9. The charges follow here-in under and as per Annexure "A".

Employer:

Date

Annexure A

CHARGE SHEET

Introduction

1. At all material times hereto, the employee was the Chief of State Protocol with the post of Deputy Director General, having as his duties and functions, *inter alia*, the following: Support of Political Principals; the promotion of South Africa abroad; Policy Formulation and Advise; Strategic Management of the Branch and Interdepartmental and Intra-governmental Liaison.
2. The allegations against the employee arises from the employee's role in facilitating the landing of a private chartered flight on 30 April 2013 at the Airforce Base Waterkloof, a strategic entry point ("the base") between 06h50 and 07h00. This occurrence was in contravention and breach of the law and norm in that a privately chartered flight is not permitted to utilise the base for purposes of landing.
3. The chartered flight carried guests of the Gupta family attending the Gupta wedding that took place on the days following the landing at the base for the well-known Sun City resort.

4. The base would ordinarily only receive flights classified as military flights, VVIP flights or VIP flights. The former would include heads of State and/or government and Ministers. No commercial or charter flights would receive permission to land except in an emergency situation. The Standard Operating Procedures for the issuing of such clearances issued in July 2007 state clearly in paragraph 7(b):

"Note that only military personnel, head and deputy head of State may make use of the Airforce Base Waterkloof."

5. The allegations of wrongdoing levelled against the employee is that the employee participated, together with other senior government officials, to facilitate the landing of a private aircraft for personal affairs at the base, namely the guests of the Gupta family, for the Gupta wedding.
6. In so doing, the employee, together with other senior employees, brought ~~the reputation of the government into disrepute and compromised the~~ integrity and security of the State.
7. In particular, the allegation against this employee is that he embarrassed and tarnished the image and reputation of the President of the Republic of South Africa and the country as a whole in falsely asserting that he participated in the scheme to permit the Gupta family to wrongly utilise the base for its own purposes because of pressure brought on him by the Presidency.

The role of the employee and the allegations concerning his wrongful conduct

Charge 1

8. It is alleged that during the period February 2013 to April 2013 the employee abused diplomatic channels and took it upon himself to facilitate an illegal request for landing of an international aircraft at the Airforce Base Waterkloof on 30 April 2013 between 06h50 and 07h00.

9. The factors in support of charge 1 are the following:

9.1. The Indian High Commission failed to provide a Note Verbale to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. This was a serious infringement of diplomatic protocol and heralded that this was not State business, but a private matter.

9.2. The employee spoke directly to the command post, Airforce Base Waterkloof, which was in conflict of the protocol to be used, in that the employee did not follow proper process by communicating with the head of the Defence Force responsible for the affairs of the base.

9.3. The employee stated that there would be four to five Ministers on the flight, which would be the equivalent of the Members of the

Executive Council in South Africa, whereas this was not the case and this constituted a misrepresentation.

- 9.4. The employee in his communications with the command post “dropped” the names and/or titles of the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Defence, Military Veterans, and the President in an effort to pressurise the command post to issue the clearance for such illegal landing.

Charge 2

10. It is alleged that the employee misrepresented facts in an endeavour to procure the illegal and unlawful and/or wrongful landing.

11. The facts in support of this allegation are the following:

- 11.1. The employee represented to the command post (Sergeant-Major Ntshisi) in charge of permitting such landing that this was a unique case with the knowledge that it was not.
- 11.2. The employee motivated why he could not put the request in writing by innuendos that the President wanted to be of assistance to the Gupta family.

Charge 3

14. The employee compromised the processes and procedures of his employer in that:

14.1. There was no review and/or recommendation from the Political Desk in the Department on this particular request; and

14.2. The interdepartmental coordination process that normally ensues did not take place.

15. The evidence in support of this charge will be:

15.1. On 9 April 2013, the employee presented to the Directorate State Visits that the request for flight clearances and landing at Waterkloof Airforce Base for the Indian delegation was telephonically approved by himself.

15.2. The employee failed to provide an official clearance request when requested to do so by Sergeant-Major Ntshisi at the air force command post.

15.3. An individual in the Indian High Commission requested the employee on 24 April 2013 to facilitate arrangements for a private wedding reception at the Waterkloof Airforce Base. This

amounted to the use of a senior government official to arrange a wedding reception at a strategic entry point, which was a major security violation.

27th
SIGNED AT PRETORIA ON THIS THE 24th DAY OF JULY 2013


EMPLOYER

JUTIE

Acknowledgement of receipt

I, Nasi Bruce Koloane (full names)

herewith acknowledge receipt of the notice of the disciplinary hearing including the charge sheet.


(SIGNATURE)

27/06/2013
(DATE)



international relations & cooperation

Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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Ambassador VB Koloane

Deputy Director – General: State Protocol

Head Office

PRETORIA


03 July 2013

Dear Amb Koloane

NOTICE OF RE-SCHEDULED DATE OF THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING

1. You are hereby given notice of the re-scheduled disciplinary hearing as per our telephone discussion.
2. The hearing will be held at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, OR Tambo Building, Welcome Centre Boardroom 4, in Pretoria on the 11th July 2013 at 09h30 for 10h00.
3. Attached please receive some of the documents you requested. The outstanding will be delivered to you as soon as they are available.
4. Your co-operation will be highly appreciated

Yours sincerely


for Employer

Deputy Director-General: HR

Date: 03.07.2013

I, VB Koloane....., hereby acknowledge receipt of this rescheduling notice on

Enclosures: Chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook; JCPS Cluster Report; and the 2013/14 Performance Agreement.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR-GENERAL

BRANCH: HUMAN RESOURCES

File	13had107/06/27
Date	27 June 2013
Type	Submission
Status	For approval

22036
DDG Ref

Subject: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO APPOINT FROM OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT/PUBLIC SERVICE A CHAIRPERSON AND A DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE IN A DISCIPLINARY HEARING.

1. PURPOSE

To request approval for the use of persons outside the Department/Public Service as panel for the disciplinary hearing in the case of Amb. B Koloane.

2. SUMMARY

- 2.1 The Department has charged Amb Koloane, the Deputy Director - General responsible for State Protocol, with misconduct in terms of Chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook.
- 2.2 In view of the fact that Amb. Koloane's rank is only below that of the Director - General, it therefore follows that the employer has a limitation to secure a Chairperson within the Department. Efforts to find a Director - General within the Public Service did not succeed. Furthermore the Department is not capable to find someone within the Department or Public Service to serve as Departmental Representative.
- 2.3 The Department is left with no option than to secure the services of persons outside the Public Service to serve as Chairperson and Departmental Representative respectively.
- 2.4 In as far as a Chairperson is concerned; the GPSSBC will be approached to provide names of possible Commissioners who have experience in conducting disciplinary hearings.
- 2.5 With respect to a Departmental Representative, the Chairperson of the Departmental Risk Management Committee will be approached to serve in the capacity.
- 2.6 The disciplinary hearing should be held within 10 working days from the date of serving charges to Amb. Koloane.

3. RECOMMENDATION(s)

It is recommended that the Director-General approve:

- 3.1 The use of persons from outside the Department/Public Service to serve as the Chairperson and Departmental Representative respectively.
- 3.2 That the approved revised remuneration tariff for Audit Committee members for ad-hoc meetings be used as benchmark for the remuneration for the services rendered by the panel members (Chairperson and Departmental Representative).

13had107/06/27

4. DISCUSSION

- 4.1 The Department has charged Amb Koloane, the Deputy Director - General responsible for State Protocol, with misconduct in terms of Chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook.
- 4.2 In view of the fact that Amb. Koloane's rank is only below that of the Director - General, it therefore follows that the employer has a limitation to secure a Chairperson within the Department. Efforts to find a Director - General within the Public Service did not succeed. Furthermore the Department is not capable to find someone within the Department or Public Service to serve as Departmental Representative.
- 4.3 The Department is left with no option than to secure the services of persons outside the Public Service to serve as Chairperson and Departmental Representative respectively.
- 4.4 In as far as a Presiding Officer is concerned; the GPSSBC will be approached to provide names of possible Commissioners who have experience in conducting disciplinary hearings.
- 4.5 With respect to a Departmental Representative, the Chairperson of the Departmental Risk Management Committee will be approached to serve in the capacity.
- 4.6 Should the charged be served to Amb Koloane today (27 June 2013), the disciplinary hearing should be held within 10 working days.

5. FINANCIAL/LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

- 3.3 **Financial:** Yes. That the Departmental approved revised remuneration tariff for Audit Committee members for ad-hoc meetings be used as benchmark for the remuneration for the services rendered by the panel members (Chairperson and Departmental Representative).

5.1

- 5.2 **Legal:** SMS Handbook Chapter 7.

CONFIDENTIAL

Director-General / / 2013
Date

Approved	Not Approved	Approved as amended
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DIRECTOR OFFICE OF THE 2013-07-05 The Director-General DEPT. OF LABOUR REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	2013 07 05
--	------------------

Deputy Director-General Date

DEPT: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS & CO-OPERATION DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL 2013-06-27 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA PRIVATE BAG X 152 PRETORIA 0001	2013 06 27
--	------------------

DRAFTER	DATE / STAMP	SIGNATURE
T. Neluonde, had107, ext 11283 Deputy Director: Labour Relations	27/06/2013	T. Neluonde

4. DISCUSSION

- 4.1 The Department has charged Amb Koloane, the Deputy Director - General responsible for State Protocol, with misconduct in terms of Chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook.
- 4.2 In view of the fact that Amb. Koloane's rank is only below that of the Director - General, it therefore follows that the employer has a limitation to secure a Chairperson within the Department. Efforts to find a Director - General within the Public Service did not succeed. Furthermore the Department is not capable to find someone within the Department or Public Service to serve as Departmental Representative.
- 4.3 The Department is left with no option than to secure the services of persons outside the Public Service to serve as Chairperson and Departmental Representative respectively.
- 4.4 In as far as a Presiding Officer is concerned; the GPSSBC will be approached to provide names of possible Commissioners who have experience in conducting disciplinary hearings.
- 4.5 With respect to a Departmental Representative, the Chairperson of the Departmental Risk Management Committee will be approached to serve in the capacity.
- 4.6 Should the charged be served to Amb Koloane today (27 June 2013), the disciplinary hearing should be held within 10 working days.

5. FINANCIAL/LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

- 5.1 **Financial:** Yes. That the Departmental approved revised remuneration tariff for Audit Committee members for ad-hoc meetings be used as benchmark for the remuneration for the services rendered by the panel members (Chairperson and Departmental Representative).
- 5.2 **Legal:** SMS Handbook Chapter 7.





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Dr HN Manzini
Independent Development Trust
Mpumalanga Province
NELSPRUIT

Dear Dr Manzini

THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING OF AMB VB KOLOANE

The above matter has reference.

Following your appointment as the Departmental Representative, you are hereby informed that the disciplinary hearing will be held as follows:


Date: 11 July 2013

Time: 10:00 – 16:30

**Venue: Welcome Centre Room No. 14
OR Tambo Building, 460 Soutpansberg Rd
PRETORIA**

Your willingness to assist in this regard is highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely


Amb. JM Matjila
Director - General
Date: 09/07/13

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Department:
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Tel: +27 (0) 12 351 1000 • www.dirco.gov.za

Ambassador VB Koloane
Deputy Director – General: State Protocol
Head Office
PRETORIA


Dear Amb Koloane

CHANGE OF VENUE FOR THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING OF AMB VB KOLOANE

You are hereby informed that the venue of the disciplinary hearing as communicated in the previous correspondence has been changed from **OR Tambo Building, Welcome Centre Boardroom 4** to **Johnny Makhathini Guesthouse, 201 Matroosberg Road, Waterkloof Heights, Waterkloof.**

Your co-operation will be highly appreciated

Yours sincerely


for Employer

Deputy Director- General: HR

Date: 10.07.2013

I, VB Koloane....., hereby acknowledge receipt of the change of address.

Kgoro ya Tiriso le Tshomiso ya Dinaga tsa Botlhabatshaba • Lefapha la Dikamano le Tshebediso Dinaheng tsa Matjhaba • Lefapha la Dikamano tsa Botlhabatshaba le Tiriso • UMnyango Wezobudlelwano Nokubambisana Bamazwe Namazwe • Litiko Letebudlelwane Bemave kanye Nekusebeni-sana • ISebe lezobudlelwane neNtsebenziswano yamaZwe ngamaZwe • UMnyango weTjhebiswano nokuSebenzisana kweenTjhabatjhaba • Muhasho wa Vhushaka ha Dzitshakatshaka na Tshumisano • Ndzawulo ya Vuxaka bya Matiko ya Misava na Ntirhisano • Departement van Internasionale Betrekkinge en Samewerking



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& cooperation

Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

ATTENDANCE REGISTER

DISCIPLINARY HEARING OF AMBASSADOR VB KOLOANE

WATERKLOOF GUESTHOUSE, 11 JULY 2013

INITIALS AND SURNAME	DESIGNATION	TEL/EMAIL	SIGNATURE
Adv. M.B. Malletjane	Chair person	082 730 0463	
V.B. Keloane	ooc	078 801 0938	
T. Molise	LR	0721474536	
T. Tleluende	LR	073 98324904	
M.M. Mnyama	Employer Representative	083 264 0522	

[illegible]



IN THE DISCIPLINARY ENQUIRY**[HELD AT PRETORIA]**

In the matter between:

**THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION****THE EMPLOYER**

and

AMBASSADOR B.V KOLOANE**THE EMPLOYEE**

CHAIRPERSON'S RULING

1.

Details of the Hearing and Representation.

The employee, Ambassador B.V. Koloane appeared before me on 11 July 2013. The matter was finalised on the same day.

Venue : Pretoria

Employer Representative : Dr H.N. Manzini

Employee Representative : Self

Chairperson : Adv M.B. Matlejoane

2.

The employee faced 3 charges. He received the charge sheet on the 27 June 2013.

The charges are as follows:

" Charge 1"

8. It is alleged that during the period February 2013 to April 2013 the employee abused diplomatic channels and took it upon himself to facilitate an illegal request for landing of an international aircraft at the Airforce Base Waterkloof on the 30 April 2013 between 06h50 and 07h00.

"Charge 2"

10. It is alleged that the employee misrepresented facts in an endeavour to procure the illegal and unlawful and / or wrongful landing.

"Charge 3"

14. The employee compromised the processes and procedures of his employer in that:

- 14.1 There was no review and/ or recommendation from the Political Desk in the Department on this particular request; and
- 14.2 The interdepartmental coordination process that normally ensues did not take place.

3.

The Employee at the outset raised a point that there is a splitting of the charges and I allowed both parties to address me on that point. After listening to arguments from both parties it became apparent that the employee in actual fact, was objecting to the evidence stated in support of the charges.

The Employer representative argued that the charges are as stated above and the evidence in support of the charges was intend to show the employee the evidence that was going to be led to prove each charge.

4.

The parties asked for the adjournment of the proceeding in order to deliberate among themselves on the point raised by the employee.

5.

When the matter resumed, the employee informed me that he is ready to plead to the charges as captured above with the exclusion of the facts and evidence in support of the charges.

6.

The Employee pleaded guilty to all three (3) charges. I went through each charge in order to satisfy myself that the employee understand the elements of each of the charges. The employee persisted with his guilty plea on each charge.

7.

I consequently find the employee guilty of charges 1 to 3.

8.

The disciplinary enquiry is postponed to 22 July 2013 for the purpose of the parties advancing aggravating and mitigating factors to consider when I determine the appropriate sanction.

Adv. M.B Matlejoane

Chairperson

Date: 17 July 2013





IN THE DISCIPLINARY ENQUIRY
[HELD AT PRETORIA]

In the matter between:

**THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION**

EMPLOYER

and

AMBASSADOR V.B. KOLOANE

EMPLOYEE

SANCTION

1.

On 11 and 22 July 2013 I presided over the disciplinary enquiry of Ambassador V.B. Koloane. Ambassador Koloane conducted his own defence and the Department was represented by Dr. H.N. Manzini. I wish to express my gratitude towards both parties' for the diligent and professional manner in which these proceedings were conducted.

2.

Ambassador Koloane pleaded guilty to all three (3) charges levelled against him on 11 July 2013. The plea of guilty was accepted by the employer and no evidence was led. I accordingly found him guilty in my ruling dated 18 July 2013.

3.

On 22 July 2013 both parties addressed me on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Dr. Manzini submitted on behalf of the employer aggravating factors in four (4) parts, namely:

3.1 Factors in respect of Procedural issues.

The employer was guided by the Labour Relations Act, Chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook and the Code of Conduct for Public Service in managing the Misconduct. The employer also took note of the Explanatory Manual on the Code of Conduct for the Public Service.

3.2 The Seriousness of the Misconduct.

The employer is alive to the fact that the employee holds a position of DDG which is the second highest in command to the Accounting Officer of the Department. He is at the helm of the state protocol of the Republic of South Africa. The Department is a custodian of international relations and cooperation, therefore mandated to maintain good diplomatic relations. The Department relies on the employee as the Chief of State Protocol in order to achieve its mandate. At the heart of the employees' functions and duties is support of political principals; the promotion of South Africa abroad; policy formulation and advise; strategic management of the branch and interdepartmental and intra-governmental liaison. Following due channels underpins the sustainability of such relations. The employees' actions in relation to the unlawful landing of an aircraft at the Waterkloof Air Base involved diplomatic relations with another country i.e. India. The employer submitted that even though the employee did not act alone, he contributed substantially to the unlawful landing of the aircraft.

The employee is assigned the responsibility to act as a project manager as reflected under the roles and responsibilities captured in Chapter 9 of the Policy for Incoming International Visits.

3.3 Personal Circumstances of the Employee.

The employee was appointed in March 2007 but served the Department on secondment since 2003. In 2011 he was appointed to the position of the Chief of State Protocol on DDG level. The member does not have previous convictions and was never subjected to a disciplinary enquiry before. The employer take note that by pleading guilty he has acknowledged wrongdoing and that is viewed as a first step towards rehabilitation. This in effect calls for a lighter sanction of final written warning which will uphold the principle of discipline being a corrective measure as opposed to a punitive one. The employee has shown remorse for his actions and as stated, is a first offender.

3.4 The Interest of the Employer.

I was drawn to the elements contained in the charges namely:

3.4.1 Abuse of diplomatic channels.

3.4.2 Misrepresentation of the facts.

3.4.3 Compromising procedure and processes.

Dr Manzini submitted that the state through the employer has entrusted the member with the responsibilities of managing diplomatic channels so as to ensure that the employer maintain sound international relations and cooperation. The employee

admitted that he betrayed the trust that the employer entrusted in him by assigning such crucial responsibilities to him. The nation look upon members of cabinet under the leadership of the President for guidance and sound leadership particularly on matters of national interest by virtue of their positions and authority. The mention of their names is therefore associated with authority. The employee admitted that he misrepresented the facts in order to secure an illegal landing. This is clearly a dismissable offence.

Protocol is by nature procedure and process bound. It requires a high level of precision and missing one step can put the whole state protocol in disarray and may lead to serious embarrassment to the state. By compromising procedures and processes, the employee secured the illegal landing of an Indian aircraft at the strategic key point.

The elements of the offences demonstrate the seriousness of the employee's conduct and its consequences. As a senior member of the employer, he is expected to uphold the integrity of the state as far as protocol is concerned. His failure to do so has led to embarrassment to the Government.

The employer further argued that it is charged with the responsibility of managing international relations and cooperation and in this regard various branches have been established to deal with specific issues in relation to international relations. The core branch that binds them is the State Protocol branch. If due processes and procedures are not followed, they could be rendered invalid. State Protocol is therefore the backbone of the employer in managing its interest.

The consequence of abusing diplomatic channels by compromising processes and procedures had a negative impact on diplomatic relations with India. As a result, the

employer is faced with the task of rebuilding relations with India which could have been averted. The nation also has to be assured that the strategic key point is in good hands. The mention of people in high authority has brought them into disrepute. The employer argued that despite the seriousness of the offences, the trust relationship has not broken down.

4.

In mitigation, Ambassador Koloane admitted that there was indeed an error of judgement on his side regarding his failure to verify whether or not the Indian High Commissioner attached the note verbale when requesting the landing of the aircraft. It was his belief that the relations between SA and India were dented and that became apparent during the BRICS summit. He submitted that when he was informed that the aircraft is carrying ministers he acted hastily albeit in good faith in order to rebuild relations between the two countries. Ambassador Koloane submitted that throughout his service in government which goes back to 1996 when he was in the DTI, he has a distinguished record the manifestation of that being that he joined the public service as an Assistant Director in 1996 and was appointed by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation in 2007 and by 2011, he was appointed on the DDG level.

Furthermore, due to his distinguished service he was given the privilege and honour of representing the interests of the country abroad in Egypt, Japan, China and Spain. Throughout his service abroad not once did the Auditor- General nor Internal Audit of the Department find any fault with the manner in which he conducted himself as the head of diplomatic missions in Shanghai, China and Spain.

Despite the parties' submissions, I am of course not bound by them. I must exercise my discretion independently with regard to all the relevant facts in determining the appropriate sanction.

6.

Whilst it cannot be ignored that Ambassador Koloane's conduct directly led to the illegal landing of an Indian aircraft at the strategic key point causing severe embarrassment to the Government, I must note that I was not presented with any evidence to the effect that he was in any way involved in or aware of any corrupt activities surrounding the illegal landing of the aircraft. In mitigation, Ambassador Koloane submitted that he did not receive any benefit, financial or otherwise throughout the process of assisting the Indian High Commission. Nevertheless I take into account as an aggravating factor the fact that such embarrassment was indeed caused to the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

7.

The facts show that Ambassador Koloane abused diplomatic channels and took it upon himself to facilitate the illegal request for the landing of the aircraft. In mitigation Ambassador Koloane admitted that due to error of judgement he failed to verify if the Indian High Commission provided a note verbale to the Department. That was despite the fact that he is expected to be well versed with diplomatic protocol. He went further by directly speaking to the command post, Air force Base Waterkloof and stated that there would be four to five Ministers on the flight and furthermore "dropped" the names of Minister of Transport, Minister of Defence and the President in order to pressurise the command post to issue the clearance for the illegal landing of the aircraft. In mitigation, Ambassador Koloane submitted that whilst there are

11.

Based on my consideration of the facts, both parties' aggravating and mitigating factors, I strongly recommend that the employer seriously consider redeploying Ambassador Koloane to another branch in order to revive the confidence integrity and efficiency of state protocol.


12.

In the circumstances I pronounce the following sanction:

12.1 Suspension without pay for a period of two months as an alternative to dismissal in terms of Clause 2.7 (4) of Chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook.

12.2 A final written warning which shall be placed on the employee's personal file and shall remain valid for six (6) months.

Dated at Pretoria on this the 29 July 2013



Adv. M.B. Matlejoane



CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR-GENERAL

BRANCH: HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

File	13had107/08/07
Date	07 August 2013
Type	Submission
Status	For Approval

22793

DG 065/13

Subject: Authorization to implement the suspension without pay sanction**1. PURPOSE**

To request approval to implement the suspension without pay after the disciplinary hearing of Amb VB Koloane

2. SUMMARY

- 2.1 Amb Koloane, DDG: State Protocol was brought before the disciplinary committee for misconduct. The disciplinary hearing was convened on 11 and 22 July 2013. Amb Koloane pleaded guilty to all the charges. Chairperson's ruling is attached as (**Annexure A**).
- 2.2 The Director General, Amb JM Matjila notified Amb Koloane of the sanction as imposed by the Chairperson on a letter dated 30 July 2013 as per Section 16B (1) (b) of the Public Service Act, 1994 as amended. A two months Suspension without Pay and a Final Written Warning was imposed as sanction by the Chairperson. Notice of sanction: (**Annexure B**).
- 2.3 Amb Koloane responded to the Director-General on 31 July 2013, acknowledging receipt of the notice of sanction imposed on him by the Chairperson. Amb Koloane requested that the two months Suspension without pay be implemented as from 16 August 2013 to 15 October 2013. Response from Amb Koloane is attached as (**Annexure C**).


3. RECOMMENDATION(s)

It is recommended that the Director-General approves the implementation of sanction against Amb Koloane.

Annexes for Signature:

- A. Letter to Ms A du Plessis.

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Director-General

19/08/2013
DateApproved ☒Not Approved ☐Approved as
amended ☐



DIRCO OFFICE OF THE 02013-00-15 DIRECTOR-GENERAL REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA	22793
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DDG

08/08/2013
Date

DEPT. OF GENERAL 18/08/2013 AFRICA 152	11985
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OFFICIAL	DATE / STAMP	SIGNATURE
Mr TM Molefe, HAD104, X10815 ACTING DIRECTOR	08/08/2013	
Ms T Neluonde, HAD107, X11283 DEPUTY DIRECTOR	08/08/2013	

Drafter: T Neluonde

User: had107 Ext.: 11283

CONFIDENTIAL

4. DISCUSSION

- 4.1 Amb Koloane, DDG: State Protocol was brought before the disciplinary committee for misconduct. The disciplinary hearing was convened on 11 and 22 July 2013. Amb Koloane pleaded guilty to all the charges. Chairperson's ruling : (**Annexure A**).
- 4.2 The Director General, Amb JM Matjila notified Amb Koloane of the sanction as imposed by the Chairperson on a letter dated 30 July 2013 as per section 16B (1) (b) of the Public Service Act of 1994 as amended. A two months Suspension without pay and a Final written Warning was imposed as sanction by the Chairperson. Notice of sanction: (**Annexure B**).
- 4.3 Amb Koloane responded to the Director-General on 31 July 2013, acknowledging receipt of the notice of sanction imposed on him by the Chairperson. Amb Koloane requested that the two months Suspension without pay be implemented as from 16 August 2013 to 15 October 2013. Response from Amb Koloane: (**Annexure C**).

5. FINANCIAL/LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

- 5.1 **Financial: None at this stage**
- 5.2 **Legal: None at this stage**







international relations & cooperation

Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Private Bag X152, PRETORIA, 0001 • OR Tambo Bld, 460 Soutpansberg Road, Rietondale, PRETORIA, 0084
Tel: +27 (0) 12 351 1000 • www.dirco.gov.za

Ms A du Plessis
Director: Human Resource Administration
SE4-01-090
Head Office

Dear Ms du Plessis

Outcome of the disciplinary hearing of Amb VB Koloane and the implementation of the sanction

Amb Koloane was charged with misconduct and brought before a disciplinary committee on 11 and 22 July 2013. A two months Suspension Without Pay and a Final Written Warning was imposed as sanction by the Chairperson. This sanction was communicated to Amb Koloane on 30 July 2013.

Amb Koloane acknowledged receipt of the sanction on a letter dated 31 July 2013, requesting that the implementation of the Suspension Without Pay be effected from 16 August 2013 to 15 October 2013.

You are hereby requested to implement the suspension without pay as stipulated above. See the attached letter of sanction and the acknowledgment letter from Amb Koloane.

Yours sincerely


Ambassador JM Matjila
Director-General

Date:

19/08/2013

Ref: 13Had107/08/07

Kgoro ya Tirisano le Tshomišano ya Dinaga tša Boditšhabatšhaba • Lefapha la Dikamano le Tshebedisano Dinaheng tsa Matjhaba • Lefapha la Dikamano tsa Boditšhabatšhaba le Tirisano • UMnyango Wezobudlelwano Nokubambisana Bamazwe Namazwe • Litiko Letebudlelwano Bemave kanye Nekusebentisana • ISebe lezobudlelwane neNtsebenziswano yamZwe ngamaZwe • UmNyango weTjhebiswano nokuSebenzisana kweenTjhabaTjhaba • Muhasho wa Vhushaka ha Dzitshakatshaka na Tshumisano • Ndzawulo ya Vuxaka bya Matiko ya Misava na Ntirhisano • Departement van Internasionale Betrekkings en Samewerking

Confidential

To: Director-General (DIRCO)

Ambassador JM Matjila

Re: Department of International Relations and Cooperation/ Ambassador VB Koloane

This letter serves to, both, acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 31 July 2013 regards the above-captioned subject, as well as to confirm acceptance of the terms of the sanction imposed on me, namely, :

1. Suspension without pay for a period of two (2) months as an alternative to dismissal in terms of clause 2.7 (4) of chapter 7 of the SMS Handbook.
2. A final written warning which shall be placed on my personal file for and shall remain valid for six (6) months.

I would further like to request that the implementation of 1 above be from 16 August 2013 to 15 October 2013.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours sincerely



Ambassador VB Koloane

Date : 31 July 2013



LIST OF HEADS OF MISSION POSTS: JUNE 2014 CYCLE

MISSION	COUNTRY	NOMINEE
ACCRA	GHANA	
WASHINGTON	USA	
ALGIERS	ALGERIA	
WARSAW	POLAND	
SEOUL	KOREA	
MORONI	COMOROS	
MADRID	SPAIN	
COPENHAGEN	DENMARK	
CANBERRA	AUSTRALIA	
THE HAGUE	NETHERLANDS	
MANILA	PHILLIPINES	
NOUAKCHOTT	MAURITANIA	
KHARTOUM	SUDAN	
PARIS	FRANCE	
AMMAN	JORDAN	
JEDDAH	SAUDI ARABIA	
KUWAIT CITY	KUWAIT	
KAMPALA	UGANDA	





**MINISTER
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

Private Bag X152, PRETORIA, 0001 • OR Tambo Bld, 460 Soutpansberg Road, Fietondale, PRETORIA • Tel: 012 351 1000 • Fax: 012 329 1000
17th Floor, Room 1703, 120 Plein Street, CAPE TOWN, 8001 • Tel: 021 464 3700 • Fax: 021 465 6548 • www.dirco.gov.za

3 June 2014

Dear Mr. President

I have the honour to submit the following nomination for the Head of Mission post at the South Africa Embassy in The Hague.

Country: Netherlands, The Hague


Nominee: Mr Vusi Bruce Koloane

Mr Vusi Bruce Koloane was born on 22 August 1962. After completing his schooling he pursued his interest in education by completing an Honours Degree in Economics. He began his career as an Assistant Director at the Department of Trade and Industry and then served at Missions in Egypt, Japan and China (both Shanghai as Consul General and Beijing as Charge' de Affairs). During his career he played an active role in Promoting trade, tourism, technology transfer and attracting Investments to South Africa. From 2007 to 2010 he served as the South African Ambassador to the Kingdom of Spain. He was also a founding member of the DCO Matiwane Youth League, Sobantu Youth Organisation and Imbali Youth Organisation.

In 2011 he was elected as the Deputy Director-General where he served in several different portfolios including being the Chief of State Protocol, a position he occupied until October 2013. He was then appointed as the Deputy Director-General- Operations in the Office of the Director General, where he currently still serves.

Mr President, should you approve the nomination, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation will request agreement from the country in question in accordance with international practice. Once approval has been granted, the usual public announcement of the appointment will be made.


Yours respectfully



Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, MP

Mr. JG Zuma
President of the
Republic of South Africa
Union Buildings
PRETORIA

The above-mentioned nomination for the Head of Mission post at the South Africa Embassy in The Hague is hereby approved.



Mr. JG Zuma
President of the
Republic of South Africa

Date: 4/06/2014





Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Protocol Department
DKP-2014/602


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of South Africa and with reference to its note 17/4/NLD/D3 dated 19 June 2014, has the honour to communicate that on 14 July 2014 His Majesty the King has graciously granted agreement to the nomination of Mr Vusi Bruce KOLOANE as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of South Africa to His Court.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Republic of South Africa the assurances of its highest consideration.

The Hague, 17 July 2014



Embassy of the Republic of South Africa
Wassenaarseweg 40
2596 CV The Hague









JCPS CLUSTER REPORT

LANDING OF A CHARTERED COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT AT AIR FORCE BASE WATERKLOOF

17 May 2013



government

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

**INVESTIGATION INTO THE LANDING OF A CHARTERED COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
AT AIR FORCE BASE WATERKLOOF ON 30 APRIL 2013**

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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem Statement

On 30 April 2013 Jet Airways charter flight JAI 9900 landed at Air Force Base Waterkloof, a strategic entry point, referred to in this report as "the base", between 06h50 and 07h00. This was deemed a national security incident. The Ministers of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster instructed on 2 May 2013 that a team of Directors-General investigate the circumstances that gave rise to the incident, and report their findings within seven working days. The members of the Investigating Team, referred to in this report as "the team", were the following:

- 1.1.1 Mr D.T. Dlomo: Acting Director-General of the State Security Agency.
- 1.1.2 Ms N. Sindane: Director-General of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development.
- 1.1.3 Mr T.S. Moyane: National Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services.
- 1.1.4 Dr C.G. Swemmer: Acting Coordinator for Intelligence (co-opted).

1.2 Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference governing the work of the team were the following:

- 1.2.1 Determine the sequence of events prior to, during and after the landing of the chartered commercial aircraft at Air Force Base Waterkloof.
- 1.2.2 Assess the actual events in the light of the established legislation, regulations, government and departmental protocols.
- 1.2.3 Interview and interact with relevant persons to establish facts, and factor in investigations currently under way.
- 1.2.4 Make findings and recommendations to avert similar occurrences in future.

1.3 Methodology

In conducting the investigation the team approached the incident in four phases, namely the pre-arrival phase, arrival phase, post-arrival phase and exit phase, and conducted its work according to these phases.

The methodology adopted included the scrutiny of relevant documentary evidence; the scrutiny of departmental submissions; interviews with officials and individuals involved in the matter; investigations conducted within affected departments; and in loco visits.

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The visits consisted of the following:

- 1.3.1 On 9 May 2013: to the Chief of the South African Air Force (SAAF), Lieutenant-General F.Z. Msimang, which visit was further assisted by General Mccetywa; interaction with Sergeant-Major Thabo Ntshisi at the Air Force Command Post; interviews at the base with Colonel Visser responsible for reception of VIPs visitors; Lieutenant-Colonel Mdluli, Officer Commanding Movement Control; and loadmasters Sergeants Mohlala and Manganyi.
- 1.3.2 On 10 May 2013 at the base with Lieutenant-Colonel Fredrikson; with Sergeant-Major Van Bentheim responsible for security; at the South African Revenue Service (SARS) with Commissioner Oupa Magashula, Chief Operating Officer Barry Hore, and Mr J.J. Louw, the Legal Advisor; at O.R. Tambo International Airport with Mr Ockert Jacobs, Deputy Director Port Health, Gauteng Province; with Lieutenant-General Nyembe, Chief of Defence Intelligence; and at the offices of the Department of Defence and Military Veterans with the Advisor to the Minister, Mr Michael (Mike) Ramagoma.
- 1.3.3 The Investigating Team conducted interviews on 13 May 2013 with Mr William Matjila from the Directorate State Visits in DIRCO; with Ms Marilyn Morris, Personal Assistant to the Chief of State Protocol, DIRCO; Warrant Officer Masilo from SAPS Border Police; Mr V. Ndwamato of the Directorate Air Transport, Department of Transport (DoT); Mr Andries Njani, Deputy Director Aviation Licencing and Permits, DoT; and Ms Adriana van der Westhuizen of the DoT. The team also met with the Minister of Transport, Mr D.B. Martins.
- 1.3.4 On 14 May 2013 Mr Mike Ramagoma visited the team to provide an explanation on his updated statement.
- 1.3.5 On 16 May 2013 the Investigating Team had a meeting with Ambassador Vusi Bruce Koloane.

In light of the availability of officials who had not been interviewed by the Investigating Team, the Team deemed it necessary to engage with them after the presentation of their report on 14 May 2013. The Investigating Team briefed the JCPS Ministers on the content on 17 May 2013, which concluded the Team's mandate.

2. CHAPTER 2: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Based on the submissions received, the team understands the sequence of events to have unfolded as follows:

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2.1 Pre-Arrival Phase

In the pre-arrival phase, the following are the standard operating procedures that would be followed by departments in preparing for the arrival of a VVIP or VIP flight at the base:

- 2.1.1 Air Force Base Waterkloof would only receive flights classified as military flights, VVIP flights or VIP flights. The former would include Heads of State and/or Government and Ministers. No commercial or charter flights would receive permission to land except in an emergency situation. The Standard Operating Procedures for the issuing of such clearances issued in July 2007 state clearly in paragraph 7(b): "Note that only military personnel, Head and Deputy Head of State may make use of AFB Waterkloof".
- 2.1.2 The Embassy or High Commission would forward a Note Verbale to the Office of the Chief of State Protocol requesting the assistance of government with the visit.
- 2.1.3 The Air Force Command Post would interact with DIRCO for clearance of state visits or VVIPs prior to issuing the clearance for continuation of the nature of the visit.
- 2.1.4 Under the Customs and Excise Act of 1964, Section 7(1A)(a), non-military and non-VIP flights seeking to land at an airport other than one of the ten customs and excise airports, would need to obtain special permission prior to landing from the Commissioner SARS to do so. This would especially be the case when the passengers are not subject to the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act of 2001.
- 2.1.5 Once clearance had been granted, the base would notify departments with immigration, customs, health, and phyto-sanitary responsibilities of the pending arrival to enable them to be in attendance at the time. This notification would take place in writing and/or via telephone notification. All the above departments would be notified for all incoming and outgoing flights. However, full protocol would only be provided during state and official visits.
- 2.1.6 DIRCO would convene and chair an interdepartmental meeting to deal with official state visits; the meeting would include the Presidential Protection Unit for visiting VVIPs and Special Envoys.
- 2.1.7 Protection for vehicle convoys of visiting delegations would be arranged at the national level by way of activation of the National JOINTS when the route crosses provincial boundaries. This is the responsibility of the National Commissioner of SAPS.

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- 2.1.8 The Department of Home Affairs would issue visas to the visitors against return flight tickets if travelling on a commercial flight, or if confirmed to travel on a charter flight.

The sequence of events in the pre-arrival phase in this specific matter is as follows:

- 2.1.9 In February 2013 Mr Tony Gupta approached the Airports Company South Africa to enquire about the use of O.R. Tambo International Airport (ORTIA) for the arrival of "at least five heads of state, ministers and senior Indian Government officials" invited to a four-day wedding event at Sun City (Source: ACSA Report; NICOC Report 1 May 2013). The Chief of State Protocol, Ambassador V. B. Koloane, attended a meeting of the Gupta family representative, Mr Tony Gupta; the Acting Chief Executive Officer of ACSA, Mr Bongani Maseko; and Minister of Transport Mr Ben Martins. At the meeting Mr Tony Gupta requested "to use facilities at the airport to welcome guests from India who were to attend a wedding" (Source: Statement by Minister Martins 13 May 2013). It was concluded that it would not be possible to use ORTIA given the request for an elaborate welcoming ceremony; this was a space used by the Department of Home Affairs for checking passports. Minister Martins agreed with ACSA's explanation (Source: NICOC Report 1 May 2013; written statement by Minister Martins). ACSA suggested that alternatives be considered, among them Lanseria or Pilanesberg airports. It was later determined that the runway at Lanseria was being upgraded. At a follow-up meeting and after enquiring with SAA, ACSA informed Mr Gupta that the apron at Pilanesberg could not accommodate an Airbus A330-200 (Source: ACSA Report).
- 2.1.10 In early March 2013 the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans was approached by Mr Atul Gupta. The Minister's Political Advisor, Mr Michael Ramagoma, was also approached by Mr Ashu Chawla on behalf of the Gupta family (Source: Response to questions by the Gupta family lawyer Mr G. van der Merwe 14 May 2013).
- 2.1.11 During the latter half of March 2013 the Political Advisor of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans approached the Chief of the South African Air Force, Lieutenant-General F.Z. Msimang, to determine the regulations governing the landing and taking off of civilian aircraft at Air Force Base Waterkloof. The Chief of the Air Force informed the Political Advisor that it would be irregular for an aircraft carrying Indian wedding guests to land at the base. The Chief of the Air Force advised the Political Advisor that the matter should not be entertained any further. This was at the time of the military developments in the CAR, and of the air force helicopter crash in the Kruger National Park (Source: Submission by the Chief of the Air Force dated 10 May 2013; confirmed by Mr Mike Ramagoma in his interview with the Team).

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- 2.1.12 On 2 April 2013 the Chief of State Protocol contacted the Political Advisor to the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans to enquire as to progress with the request. The Ambassador stated that he was "under pressure from No. 1" on the matter. The Political Advisor stated that he was not in a position to respond at that point in time (Source: Political Advisor 10 May 2013; confirmed by Ambassador V.B. Koloane on 1 May 2013 and in the interview with him on 16 May 2013).
- 2.1.13 On 3 April 2013 Mr Ramagoma met with Mr Chawla to inform him that the Minister had denied permission for a landing at the base (Source: Political Advisor 10 May 2013).
- 2.1.14 Mr Chawla then liaised with individuals in the Indian High Commission for assistance (Source: Response to questions by the Gupta family lawyer Mr G. van der Merwe dated 14 May 2013). On 4 April 2013 an individual at the Indian High Commission applied by faxed letter at 15h38 to the Air Command Unit at the Air Force Command Post for Overflight and Landing Clearance for a "Chartered Flight" at the base (Source: Fax IHC 4 April 2013). The accompanying document containing details is titled "Request for Diplomatic Overflight and Landing Clearance: South Africa". The purpose of the flight is cited under item 9 as "Delegation Visit" (Source: Indian High Commission Request 4 April 2013).
- 2.1.15 On 9 April 2013 the Chief of State Protocol telephoned Sergeant-Major Ntshisi at the Air Force Command Post to enquire as to progress with the clearance request from the Indian High Commission. Ntshisi informed the Ambassador that the base could only receive flights transporting "Heads of State and their deputies". The Ambassador responded that there would be "four to five Ministers on board". He added that the Minister of Transport, Mr Ben Martins, had been given instructions "by the President to assist the Gupta family"; that the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans "has no objection"; that "at a meeting of the Minister of Transport, the CEO of ACSA and the Guptas" he had been "told to assist"; and that "this was a unique case". Ntshisi requested "a note or a letter" from the Ambassador. The Ambassador responded that "the challenge was that this could not be put in writing". He added that he had met with Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson the previous week to "show them around the area"; Ntshisi should contact the Lieutenant-Colonel to confirm this. The Ambassador stated clearly that this was for "the Gupta family wedding". He instructed Ntshisi to call him back. On 13 May 2013, the Director-General in The Presidency stated that at no point did the President give instructions to Ambassador Koloane or discuss the issue of the landing of the aircraft with him. Regarding the specific questions posed to him relating to the pre-arrival phase, he denied that The Presidency had ever received a request for landing at Waterkloof Air Force Base from any person whatsoever.

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2.1.16 Sergeant-Major Ntshisi then telephoned Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson to enquire about the "217 Indian delegates". He was informed that she was not available and would return the call.

2.1.17 Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson returned Sergeant-Major Ntshisi's call. Anderson stated that she had just spoken to the Chief of State Protocol, who had informed her that Ntshisi had rejected the request. She questioned him as to how he could have refused such a request from the Chief of State Protocol. Ntshisi clarified that he had requested written confirmation. Anderson then stated that "in confidentiality (sic), I must be very careful now, our Number 1 knows about this. It is political. Allow them. I'll phone the Ambassador back to find out who's the senior minister". Ntshisi asked Anderson to confirm that the base could only receive flights carrying Heads of State and Ministers. Anderson responded that it depends on the visit type, and that it would be acceptable for a "private visit if DIRCO approves. It is not a problem. Yes my dear, they can".

2.1.18 The Chief of State Protocol then called Sergeant-Major Ntshisi and stated "I believe you have spoken to Colonel Anderson?" Ntshisi confirmed this and stated that he would go ahead with the clearance immediately. Ntshisi asked whether he should fax the clearance to Mr Matjila (Mr William Matjila – Directorate State Visits DIRCO). The Chief of State Protocol asked where Ntshisi was at the time and was unable to understand the explanation given. He then requested Ntshisi to e-mail a copy of the clearance to his private e-mail address and to his official e-mail address.

2.1.19 Mr William Matjila, Senior Foreign Affairs Assistant at DIRCO received a call from the Chief of State Protocol instructing him to assist with the clearance of the Indian delegation. This was the first ever and last call from the Chief of State Protocol, Ambassador Koloane to him.

2.1.20 In response to the request for a letter from Sergeant-Major Ntshisi, Mr William Matjila forwarded an e-mail sent to him by Ms. Marilyn Morris, Secretary of the Chief of State Protocol. It stated: "As per your discussion with Ambassador Koloane with regards (sic) to the request for flight clearances and landing at Waterkloof AFB for the Indian Delegation, kindly note that Amb Koloane telephonically approved the request" (Source: E-mail DIRCO at 08h33 dated 9 April 2013). All those involved confirmed this fact.

2.1.21 Mr William Matjila forwarded this e-mail to various recipients within State Protocol at DIRCO "for your urgent assistance and information" (Source: E-mail DIRCO at 08h57 on 9 April 2013).

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2.1.22 On 9 April 2013 Captain Kuffy at the IHC forwarded a request titled "Fuelling Requirement: VVIP Chartered Flight at AFB Waterkloof" to the Air Force Command Post requesting 40 tonnes of fuel for "refueling of the VVIP chartered aircraft", and requesting that this be included in the request for overflight landing and clearance dated 4 April 2013 (Source: Indian High Commission Request 9 April 2013).

2.1.23 On 9 April 2013 Lieutenant-Colonel S.J. van Zyl, who has the authority to clear flights at the Air Force Command Post, signed RSA05 External Clearance on the strength of the documentation received and conversations conducted that morning. The clearance was sent to ATNS, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the Department of Transport (DoT), the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), Chief of Joint Operations, Defence Foreign Relations and Senior Staff Officer. The clearance stated the following:

- (i) Requestor: India Delegation.
- (ii) Aircraft type: A330-200 with registration number VT-JWQ.
- (iii) Call sign: 9W 9900.
- (iv) Pax (passengers): 217.
- (v) Reason: Delegation visit.
- (vi) Fuel quantity: 13 000 litres.
- (vii) Parking/hangar facilities: N/A.
- (viii) Movements: VIP.
- (ix) Customs and/or Border Police: Yes.
- (x) Security: N/A.
- (xi) SARS: Yes.
- (xii) Foreign Operators Permit: Yes.
- (xiii) Import/export permits: Yes.
- (xiv) DOT authority required: Yes.
- (xv) Parking and landing fees to be paid: N/A.
- (xvi) "All ground handling requirements to be arranged with Lt Col Anderson at FAWK" (FAWK = Air Force Base Waterkloof) (Source RSA05 External Clearance Authority No. RSA05/V/8643/VT-JWQ/29-Apr-13).

2.1.24 On 19 April 2013 the SAPS Provincial Commissioner, North-West Province, Lieutenant-General Mbombo, received a letter from Ms Ronica Ragavan representing the Gupta family, requesting protection for the convoys that would be travelling from the base to Sun City (Source: SAPS Report 10 May 2013).

2.1.25 On 22 April 2013 Sun City Security applied to the SAPS for an Event Risk Categorisation. The request was from Mr Claud Horne, Security Manager at the Entertainment Centre, Sun City Resort. The application was forwarded to the Cluster Commander, Major-General P. Asaneng, and by the Provincial Commissioner to the

North-West Province Crime Intelligence and Operational Response Services. On hearing about the nature of the visit, the Provincial Commissioner turned down the request, and also declined to attend the wedding as a guest. A second application that emphasised the attendance of Indian Ministers at the wedding was then presented. The applicant requested that the event be categorised as High Risk, but the Deputy Provincial Commissioner: Operational Services, Major-General Mpembe, categorised the event as Medium Risk on 25 April 2013 (Source SAPS Report 10 May 2013).

2.1.26 On 23 April 2013 the base informed the following individuals and departments by fax of the arrival information of the Jet Airways flight:

- (i) DHA Immigration: J de Wet, Morare and Molefe.
- (ii) Health: Mr Jacobs.
- (iii) SARS: T. Mokhachane.
- (iv) Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: Amanda Steyn and Lawrence Mochena.
- (v) Border Police: Superintendent Moloto.
- (vi) Nature Conservation: Messrs Steenkamp and Booysen.
- (vii) SSA: Ms A. Claasen.

2.1.27 On 24 April 2013 the Indian High Commission requested the Chief of State Protocol for assistance with arranging the reception and logistics at the base (Source: NICOC Report 1 May 2013; Interview with Ambassador V.B. Koloane on 16 May 2013).

2.1.28 On 24 April 2013 the Chief of State Protocol met with Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson and an individual in the Indian High Commission at the base to discuss arrangements (Source: NICOC Report 1 May 2013; Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Mdiuli 9 May 2013; Interview with Ambassador V.B. Koloane on 16 May 2013).

2.1.29 On 25 April 2013 an individual at the Indian High Commission sent the Air Force Command Post a written request for "Permission for Private Helicopters and Chartered Flights" to land at the base. The request stated that the aircraft would be required to ferry the delegation from the base to Sun City on 30 April 2013, and back again on 3 May 2013. Tail and registration numbers for the seven helicopters and two fixed-wing aircraft were provided (Source: IHC application dated 25 April 2013).

2.1.30 On 25 April 2013 the SAPS Cluster Commander, Major-General Asaneng, convened the Operation Bojanala and South African Music Awards plenary meeting at Sun City to initiate security planning. An Operational Plan with serial number 44/2013 dated 25 April 2013 was compiled. It was recorded that Major-General Asaneng would liaise directly with Major-General Gela of Gauteng SAPS to arrange for assistance. Gauteng Province did not develop an operational plan (Source: SAPS Report 10 May 2013).

- 2.1.31 On 26 April 2013 the loadmasters were briefed in their regular 15h00 daily meeting by Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson on "the arrival of the VIP flight from India on 30 April 2013" (Source: Interview with Sergeant Manganyi 10 April 2013). The Mission Board for 29-30 April 2013 lists the Jet Airways flight as "9W 9900 – A330-22 – VIP – Delegation Visit – Delhi-WK" (Source: Mission Board Air Force Base Waterkloof; Report by the Officer Commanding dated 10 May 2013).
- 2.1.32 Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson subsequently briefed the Officer Commanding Air Force Base Waterkloof, Brigadier-General T.S. Madumane, to the effect that "a VIP aircraft from India would be arriving on 30 April 2013 with Ministers on board" (Source: Report by the Officer Commanding dated 10 May 2013). Brigadier-General Madumane then instructed that the visitors must be accorded the requisite protocols as he would be on leave.
- 2.1.33 On 29 April 2013 the Air Force Command Post issued RSA04 Internal Clearance for the helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft (Source: RSA04 Internal Clearances RSA04/V/9405/ZS-HLM/30-Apr-2013 and RSA04/V/9401/B407/30-Apr-13).
- 2.1.34 On 29 April 2013 Jet Airways lodged a flight plan for flight JAI 9900 through the Civil Aviation Briefing Office at Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, at 14h33 UTC, 16h33 SAST. The flight plan was addressed to all air traffic control authorities that would handle the flight from departure to arrival at the base. Letters of Procedure were provided to the Beira (Mozambique), Johannesburg and Waterkloof Air Traffic Service Units (ATSU's) to coordinate the transfer of control of the aircraft amongst them (Source: ATNS Report 9 May 2013).
- 2.1.35 On 29 April 2013 the lounges at the base were decorated by an unvetted private company in preparation for the arrival of Flight JAI 9900.
- 2.1.36 On 29 April 2013 the SAPS Joint Operational Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Du Plooy, activated the Event Safety and Security Planning Committee (ESSPC) and all relevant role players as the plan went operational in keeping with the Standard Operating Procedures (Source: Status Report: National Commissioner of SAPS 12 May 2013).

2.2 Arrival Phase

In the arrival phase the following procedures would normally take place:

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- 2.2.1 Air Traffic and Navigations Service (ATNS) would manage the flight from its entry into South African airspace in terms of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards, South African Civil Aviation Authority Regulations and Technical Standards, as well as the requirements and procedures published in the South African Aeronautical Information Publication.
- 2.2.2 The receiving airport radar would manage the actual landing.
- 2.2.3 Health procedures would take place according to the prescripts of Port Health.
- 2.2.4 Customs procedures would take place according to the prescripts of the Customs and Excise Act of 1964 and the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act of 2001. The latter Act quotes the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, which confer inviolability on a Head of State, Foreign Minister and Ambassadors; and lesser immunities and privileges on a Special Envoy, albeit with a certain degree of inviolability.
- 2.2.5 Immigration procedures would take place according to the Immigration Act of 2002. In terms of the latter, the Act requires that civilians present themselves physically to the Immigration Officer for processing.
- 2.2.6 Firearms would be cleared in terms of the Firearms Control Act, Act 60 of 2000.
- 2.2.7 Convoy protection for VIPs would be provided upon request by SAPS in terms of the approved Operational Plan under the Safety at Sport and Recreational Events (SSAREA) Act, Act 2 of 2010.

The arrival phase unfolded as follows:

- 2.2.8 At 05h01 on 30 April 2013 Beira Area Control coordinated Jet Airways Flight JAI 9900 with Johannesburg Area Control. The aircraft transponder was switched on for the duration of the flight using code 0527. The aircraft was under primary and secondary radar surveillance from entry into South African airspace until landing at the base. At 06h00 Johannesburg Area Control established contact with Flight JAI 9900 and confirmed the destination. At 06h17 Johannesburg Area Control made routing alterations to the flight plan due to weather conditions. At 06h38 Flight JAI 9900 established radar contact with Johannesburg radar. At 06h29 Johannesburg radar descended the flight to 8 000 feet. At 06h38, Johannesburg radar informed the flight to expect vectors for a long final approach into Waterkloof. At 06h38 Johannesburg radar descended the flight to 7 000 feet. The flight informed Johannesburg radar that it did not have Waterkloof in sight

due to the cloud cover. Johannesburg radar instructed the flight to climb to 8 000 feet for repositioning. At 06h39 the flight requested vectors for Runway 01 at the base, and at 06h45 for a ten-mile final approach to Waterkloof. At 06h50 Johannesburg radar descended the flight to 7 000 feet. At 06h53 Flight JAI 9900 informed Johannesburg radar that it had the base in sight. At 06h54, Johannesburg radar transferred the flight to Waterkloof Air Traffic Control Tower, and the ATNS service terminated. Air traffic controllers did not notice anything unusual in terms of the behavior of the flight while in South African airspace. The handling of Flight JAI 9900 was in accordance with standard operating procedures at all times (Source: ATNS Report 9 May 2013).

- 2.2.9 Seven helicopters and two fixed-wing aircraft landed at the base between 05h00 and 06h00 on 30 April 2013 and were marshaled by the loadmasters (Source: Interview with Sergeants Mohlala and Manganyi 9 May 2013). One of the helicopters and one of the aircraft bore the Sahara company logo (Source: Interview with Deputy Director Jacobs 10 May 2013).
- 2.2.10 Seven members of the SAPS Border Police from Lanseria Airport deployed on the airside at the base to undertake security scanning and a firearms check as per normal practice. No suspicious persons were identified, and no firearms were declared by the arriving guests (Source: Warrant Officer Masilo of SAPS Border Police stationed at Lanseria Airport, 13 May 2013).
- 2.2.11 Flight JAI 9900 landed at the base between 06h50 and 07h00. The flight was marshaled by Sergeant Manganyi assisted by Sergeant Mohlala. The operating agent, BidAir, placed the stairs against the aircraft and positioned its loadmasters to receive the baggage (Source: Interviews with Sergeants Mohlala and Manganyi 9 May 2013).
- 2.2.12 Health procedures were conducted by Deputy Director Ockert Jacobs of Gauteng Port Health. Deputy Director Jacobs received the disinfectant canisters and requisite health certificate from the crew and gave permission to disembark the flight (Source: Interview with Deputy Director Jacobs 10 May 2013).
- 2.2.13 BidAir commenced with the baggage offload (Source: Interview with Sergeant Manganyi 9 May 2013).
- 2.2.14 Flight Sergeant Van Benthem, responsible for security at the base, escorted the transit vehicles to the airside. The passengers started to disembark and were well behaved. The situation was, however, somewhat confused with some passengers walking to the lounges and others being ferried there by white Range Rovers. A reception had been arranged at the entrance to the lounges consisting of music and dancing. Inside the

lounges refreshments were served (Source: Interview with Flight Sergeant Van Bentheim 10 May 2013).

2.2.15 Colonel Visser was on duty to receive VIP's. Two red carpets were laid out at the entrances to the lounges. No VIP's were identified. He ended up greeting everybody who greeted him (Source: Interviews with Colonel Visser and Lieutenant-Colonel Mdluli 9 May 2013).

2.2.16 The National Immigration Branch of the Department of Home Affairs processed the passports of the incoming visitors. This was done at the immigration counters, with Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson and two members of the delegation bringing the passports to the Immigration Officers (Source: Interview with Colonel Visser 9 May 2013).

2.2.17 At 07h10 the Chief of State Protocol received a telephone call from an individual in the Indian High Commission informing him of the arrival of Flight JAI 9900. He diverted to the base and found in excess of 50 vehicles there to transport the guests. In the interview on 16 May 2013 Ambassador Koloane was no longer sure of the number of cars present, although he noted that there were no familiar VIP protectors in the cars. Some of these vehicles had already departed for Sun City upon his arrival. He was informed by Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson and three individuals from the Indian High Commission that the arrival and processing of the visitors had proceeded smoothly. No DIRCO protocol officers were present (Source: NICOC Report 1 May 2013; Interview with Ambassador V.B. Koloane on 16 May 2013).

2.2.18 Border Police were present at the base to perform their normal border security functions. They reported no illegal activity (SAPS Report 10 May 2013).

2.2.19 Port Health stood in for the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in terms of a standing arrangement between the two departments (Source: Interview with Deputy Director Jacobs 10 May 2013).

2.2.20 The baggage coming off the flight was scanned by the base security (Source: Interviews with Sergeant Manganyi, Flight Sergeant Van Bentheim and Deputy Director Jacobs 10 May 2013).

2.2.21 The helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and vehicles left the base. The vehicles were divided into four convoys of 15 vehicles each, with one police vehicle to lead the convoy and one traffic vehicle at the rear. Members of the SAPS Flying Squad were present outside the base (Source: Interview with Flight Sergeant Van Bentheim 10 May 2013; SAPS Report 10 May 2013).

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2.2.22 SAPS Gauteng deployed 31 cars and 62 members for route security; half the cars and members were allocated to the in and out trips. Gauteng Province developed a highway patrol matrix to guide the process. Extraordinary deployments were made that necessitated the utilisation of members who were not on duty. These additional deployments, which were not planned for, cost the department approximately R47 000. The Gauteng Province SAPS provided route security from ORTIA and Air Force Base Waterkloof up to the boundary with the North-West Province at the Brits Toll Plaza. The North-West Province Flying Squad consisting of five cars and six members was deployed from there to Sun City. A total of 26 security vehicles were deployed by the event organiser from ORTIA to Sun City for the convoy and guest transport. A total of 70 security vehicles were deployed by the event organiser from the air force base to Sun City (Source: SAPS Report 10 May 2013).

2.2.23 The convoys passed through the Brits Toll Plaza. At 14h08 and 14h11 on the same day two payments of R4 585-00 and R6 606-00 respectively were made into the First National Bank account of the Brits Mainline Plaza. (Source: Brits Mainline Plaza Toll Collection Work Log Sheets 42579596 and 42579611).

2.2.24 Tshwane Metro Police officials were involved in the convoy moonlighting as escorts. These Metro Police officials have now been placed on suspension by the Metro.

2.3 Post-Arrival Phase

The following developments took place during the post-arrival phase:

- 2.3.1 As the convoy travelled to Sun City it was accompanied by public comment by way of phone-ins to radio stations and comment on social media networks. An analysis of the media coverage indicates that 55% of the reporting related to the matter was negative and 45% neutral or positive (Source: Media analysis by SSA 8 May 2013).
- 2.3.2 On 30 April 2013 the Government Communication and Information Systems (GCIS) coordinated a meeting of departmental communicators to manage the media environment (Source: NICOC Report 1 May 2013).
- 2.3.3 An extended meeting of the NICOC Principals was held from 16h00 to 21h00 on 1 May 2013 to discuss the matter and coordinate a response from the security cluster. The meeting was attended by NICOC, SSA, SAPS, Defence Intelligence, DIRCO, The Presidency, Home Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Development, SARS and GCIS.

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The meeting took the following decisions:

- (i) Directors-General should interact with their Ministers and advise against attendance at the wedding at Sun City.
- (ii) The National JOINTS should be convened at 21h00 to take control of the operation from the two provinces.
- (iii) The Provincial Joint Operational Committees (ProvJOCS) should be activated to action the decisions of the National JOINTS.
- (iv) SAPS should determine immediately whether the visiting "ministers" were receiving VIP protection or not, and corrective measures should be taken.
- (v) The aircraft at the base should be removed immediately.
- (vi) A port of entry should be identified for the departure of the visitors; that port should under no circumstances be Air Force Base Waterkloof.
- (vii) Home Affairs should immediately re-authenticate who had arrived and where they were staying, and ensure that this correlated with the eventual departure register.
- (viii) SARS should immediately travel to the venue to issue customs declaration forms.
- (ix) GCIS should arrange a government press conference on 3 May 2013 to address the matter, and all communication with the media should only take place through GCIS.
- (x) Directors-General should immediately brief their respective Ministers on the outcomes of the meeting (Source: NICOC Report 1 May 2013).

2.3.4 A meeting of JCPS Ministers took place on 2 May 2013. Ministers set up a team of Directors-General to investigate the incident. A framework media statement was drafted.

2.3.5 On 2 May 2013 the Jet Airways Airbus A330-200 was moved from the FAWK base to O.R. Tambo International Airport on the instructions of the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans. The transfer was done in accordance with normal procedure (Source: ACSA Report). The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) imposed a fine of R80 000 on the airline for the flight not having had a Foreign Operators Permit (Source: CEO CAA 10 May 2013).

2.3.6 On 2 May 2013 the Director-General of DIRCO had a telephone discussion with the Indian High Commissioner, Mr V. Gupta. The High Commissioner stated that there were no Union (national) Ministers on the flight, but only state ministers. He added that the Gupta family had not asked him to assist with the arrangements for the visiting delegation (Source: DIRCO Report dated 2 May 2013).

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2.3.7 SAPS undertook a criminal investigation. On 3 May 2013 two Metro Police officials were arrested for using their official firearms during the escort and protection of the Gupta family wedding; it was determined that the registration plates of three of the vehicles used to escort the wedding party to Sun City were false; the private security company which protected the convoy on the way to Sun City was not registered with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) as a service provider; and it was determined that the security officials at the wedding were using their own firearms. It was also determined that an individual working for a bogus company had invoiced Mr Tony Gupta for the sum of R512 000 for protection services. Criminal investigations are taking place in all of these cases (Source: SAPS Report 5 May 2013). The Gupta family indicated that they had made it clear that they were prepared to pay for all services rendered by the state, and repeated that they are still prepared to do so (Source: Response from the Gupta family lawyer Mr G. van der Merwe dated 14 May 2013).

2.3.8 On 3 May 2013 the Director-General of DIRCO called in the Indian High Commissioner to discuss circumstances and procedures followed regarding the landing. It was pointed out to the High Commissioner that a Note Verbale had not been presented prior to the landing consistent with diplomatic protocol. The Indian High Commissioner responded that the failure to present a Note Verbale had been a lapse and that the point made was a valid one (Source: DIRCO Report 3 May 2013).

2.4 Exit Phase

During the exit phase the following transpired:

2.4.1 Six check-in counters were set aside at ORTIA to process the visitors (Source: DHA Report 7 May 2013). Immigration procedures were complied with, except that the seven state ministers had left on a chartered flight to Cape Town and would leave on a commercial Emirates flight to return to India (Source: DIRCO Report 3 May 2013). It was also determined that one of the arriving visitors originally listed as crew had in fact not yet left South Africa (Source: DHA Departure and Reconciliation List 7 May 2013).

2.4.2 SARS reported that no customs transgressions, apart from the late declarations, had taken place (SARS Report 10 May 2013).

2.4.3 On 8 May 2013 it was determined that the diplomatic passport numbers of three of the arriving visitors differed from the passport numbers provided to the South African High Commission in New Delhi by Sahara Computers (Pty) Ltd (Source: Undated Sahara Computers letter to the South African High Commission New Delhi; DHA Departure and Reconciliation List attached to DHA e-mail dated 7 May 2013).

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3. CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS

The analysis pertains to each of the four phases.

3.1 Pre-Arrival Phase

The first interaction occurred in February 2013 between Tony Gupta, the Chief of State Protocol, Ambassador Koloane, Minister Ben Martins and the Acting CEO of ACSA. The conclusion of this meeting was that it was not possible for ACSA to accede to the request to allow the Gupta family and their wedding guests exclusive access to the arrivals area for the purposes of their welcoming ceremony. The hosting of the arrival ceremony would not be possible as the Gupta-chartered Airbus would land during the peak arrival time of international in-bound flights.

Shortly thereafter the Gupta family approached the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and the Minister's Political Advisor. This direct approach and request for the use of a strategic entry point for a wedding was improper because this amounted to a request for untoward assistance. The refusal by the Minister based on the advice by officials was therefore correct, as she is not ordinarily involved in these approvals.

The subsequent interaction on 2 April 2013 between the Chief of State Protocol and the Political Advisor to the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans on the wedding of the Gupta family was again improper. During the interaction the Chief of State Protocol abused the name of the President of the Republic in an effort to exert pressure on the Political Advisor. This amounts to misrepresentation.

Between 2 and 4 April 2013, the approach transitioned from one characterised by the involvement of government officials in a family matter to an official diplomatic approach. This transition was effected by Mr Ashu Chawla, a fact confirmed by the Gupta family lawyer. This approach, which led to the abuse of the diplomatic channel, was a deliberate manipulation of the system to further wedding objectives couched as official business. The collusion between Chawla and an individual in the Indian High Commission to abuse the diplomatic channel to request flight clearance on 4 April 2013 is of concern, and improper in a number of respects. Firstly, the Indian High Commission failed to provide a Note Verbale to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation; this was a serious infringement of diplomatic protocol. The Indian High Commission admitted as much to the DG DIRCO in a subsequent interaction. Secondly, the request was one for "Diplomatic Overflight and Landing Clearance"; this amounts to a misrepresentation of the nature of the visit. Thirdly, the purpose of the flight was listed as "Delegation Visit"; this was again a misrepresentation of what was a wedding. It must be noted that the glossary of diplomatic terms found at www.eDiplomat.com defines a delegation as "an

official party sent to an international conference or on some other special diplomatic mission". The United Nations Institute for Training and Research's 2005 "Glossary of Terms for Diplomats" defines a delegate as "a representative of a state or organisation who has been authorised to speak and act on its behalf and who has been duly accredited to a conference".

The occurrences of 9 April 2013 are the key to understanding the subsequent developments. They revealed a number of serious concerns. It cannot be coincidental that after this abuse of diplomatic channels, the Chief of State Protocol took it upon himself to facilitate an illegal request for landing. First, the Chief of State Protocol spoke directly to the Command Post; it was not normal practice for the Chief of State Protocol to interact directly with the Command Post to enquire as to progress with a specific clearance. Second, the Chief of State Protocol stated that there would be four to five Ministers on the flight; this was a misrepresentation of the facts, as the Ministers in question are State Ministers, the equivalent of Members of the Executive Council (MEC) in South Africa, not national Ministers which could have been accorded a different status. Third, the Chief of State Protocol mentioned the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, and the President in an effort to pressure the Command Post to issue the clearance; this was improper and inappropriate, and amounted to abuse of the political clout and office of members of the National Executive. Ambassador V.B. Koloane on 1 May 2013 and 16 May 2013 confirmed that neither the President nor officials in the Presidency whether junior or senior, Ministers and Directors-General in DIRCO and Defence and Military Veterans had instructed him to assist with the landing of the aircraft. He said that he did this because he is obliged to assist official and non-official visits involving Ministers of other countries. Fourth, the Chief of State Protocol stated that this was a unique case in an effort to justify a request with which the responsible official in the Command Post was clearly uncomfortable. Fifth, the Chief of State Protocol retorted that he could not put his sensitive motivation in writing, a clear indication that he was aware of the fact that the request was dubious. Sixth, the Chief of State Protocol indicated that he had interacted with Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson on the matter, and that she could provide clarification; this amounted to abuse of an official working relationship to advance the interests of private parties. Seventh, the Chief of State Protocol admitted that the request was for the "Gupta family wedding", an admission that the status of the visit was clearly not official, diplomatic or military, and that the incoming party was not a delegation in the official understanding of the term. Whilst under normal circumstances, both official and private visits by Ministers, VIPs and VVIPs are afforded protocol services, the numbers of accompanying parties in this instance was out of the ordinary, and therefore did not qualify for such treatment.

The instruction issued by the Chief of State Protocol to Mr William Matjila, Senior Foreign Affairs Assistant in his office at DIRCO, which the Ambassador confirmed in an interview on 16 May 2013, to assist with the clearance of the Indian delegation was the first ever telephone contact from the Chief of State Protocol to this official. The Senior Foreign Affairs Assistant requested

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written confirmation for him to execute the instruction of Ambassador Koloane. Mr Matjila subsequently received an e-mail from Ms Marilyn Morris which indicated that Ambassador Koloane had telephonically approved the flight clearance request of the Indian delegation (Source: E-mail from Ms M. Morris to Mr W. Matjila dated 9 April 2013, 08h33). Mr Matjila confirmed in an interview on 13 May 2013 that no Note Verbale was received from the Indian High Commission.

It can be deduced from the opening exchange between Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson and the Command Post that the Lieutenant-Colonel had in the interim spoken with the Chief of State Protocol, because she questioned Sergeant-Major Ntshisi as to why he had rejected a request from the Chief of State Protocol. Ambassador Koloane confirmed the events as recorded. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson also stated that "Number 1" was aware of this request; this again amounted to misrepresentation of the person of the President and his Office in the matter. The Director-General in The Presidency made it clear that no one in The Presidency ever gave an instruction in this regard. This included the Private Office of the President. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson's statement cannot be a coincidence in light of the conversation between Sergeant-Major Ntshisi and Ambassador Koloane, which she was not privy to. This had an effect of bringing the person and the Office of the President into disrepute. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson also undertook to follow up with the Chief of State Protocol to obtain the name of the Minister who would be on the flight; this was an attempt to satisfy the request by the Command Post. When questioned as to the fact that the base only receives flights carrying heads of state and ministers, the Lieutenant-Colonel obfuscated and stated that this would depend on the status of the visit; she then transferred ultimate authority for the decision to DIRCO; this amounts to disregard for official policy as to the use of the base.

The request from an individual in the Indian High Commission on 9 April 2013 to provide for the re-fuelling of the aircraft compounded confusion as to the exact status of the pending visit. The application described the visit as VVIP, which was a clear misrepresentation of the facts in the extreme.

There are a number of concerns with the content of the RSA05 External Clearance issued by the Air Force Command Post on 9 April 2013. The requestor was stipulated as an Indian delegation, despite this being a wedding party. The movements are classified as VIP, again a misrepresentation of the status of the incoming party. Despite the supposed VIP status, security was listed as not applicable. Lieutenant-Colonel S.J. van Zyl who signed the clearance, stated in his submission to the Investigating Team that parking and landing fees were waived as the flight was misrepresented to be official. The misrepresentation of this fact resulted in the base not levying the landing and parking fees, although we note attempts to reverse this through the re-levying of the landing and parking fees. The Standard Operating Procedures of the Air Force Command Post require that if these fees are waived, a reason must be stipulated on the

clearance, and the clearance should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defence to grant the waiver; this was not done. It must be noted, in addition, that the Officer Commanding Air Force Base Waterkloof does not have the authority to approve or deny clearances for landings; this authority belongs solely to the Air Force Command Post.

One of the conditions for the issuing of the flight clearance was obtaining a Foreign Operators Permit (FOP) from the Department of Transport (DoT).

The absence of SARS at the base when the flight arrived has emerged as a concern. SARS was listed as a recipient of the fax sent by the base on 23 April 2013 to departments to notify them of the arrival of the flight. It has subsequently emerged that the SARS recipient of the fax was using a private fax to e-mail number to receive official communication of this nature, and had in fact left SARS a year prior to this incident. His details had, however, not been removed from the Air Force systems. This may go some way to explaining SARS's absence, as well as statements by personnel at the base that they had experienced difficulty in ensuring SARS's presence in recent months. Upon investigation it was determined that this official had continued to receive faxes about incoming international VVIP and VIP flights during the year since he had departed from SARS. This represented a major risk and could have potentially had far-reaching consequences for the security of incoming and outgoing flights.

An individual in the Indian High Commission requested the Chief of State Protocol on 24 April 2013 to facilitate arrangements for the reception at the base. This amounts to the use of a senior government official to arrange a wedding reception at a strategic entry point and was a major security violation. How this was done without raising alarm raises concern around the vigilance of officers at the base, particularly since the company involved was not vetted.

It is noteworthy that contrary to the statement by the Chief of State Protocol that he attended a meeting at the base on 24 April 2013 with Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson and a member of the Indian High Commission, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson denies that the meeting took place at all. Clearly, someone is not telling the truth.

On 25 April 2013, an individual in the Indian High Commission applied for clearances for helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft as a continuation of a legend of an official delegation, when all and sundry knew by this point that it was a wedding. The officer responsible approved the landing as this was part of the so-called diplomatic package. This had the potential of compromising national security.

It must be noted that Lieutenant-Colonel S.J. van Zyl, who signed the clearances, stated that this approval was granted because the RSA04 and RSA05 clearances were regarded as a single package and hence approved as one. It was also noteworthy that Lieutenant-Colonel van

Zyl only started working in the Air Force Command Post at the end of February 2013 and was dependent on the advice of junior officers.

Regarding planning by the SAPS, it must be noted that in terms of the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Act (SSAREA), Act 2 of 2010, the SAPS was obliged to plan for, and secure the wedding as foreign and local Ministers were attending the wedding. The failure to communicate by the two SAPS provinces is cause for serious concern, and was made worse by their non-observance of established protocol in seeking the approval of the National Commissioner. The Gauteng SAPS explanation that they were dependent on the North-West Bojanala plan is disingenuous, as they failed to obtain a copy of the plan they were supposedly dependent on.

3.2 Arrival Phase

A number of issues arose during the arrival phase.

The manner in which the aircraft was managed upon entering South African airspace until it landed at the base was in full compliance with all procedures mandated by ATNS in keeping with international conventions, procedures and protocols.

Concerning the supposed late arrival at the base by the Chief of State Protocol, and his subsequent statement to Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson that he had forgotten the date of arrival, Lieutenant-Colonel S.J. van Zyl from the Air Force Command Post stated in his submission that the Command Post informed Ambassador Koloane of the estimated arrival time by e-mail.

It is noteworthy, that during the arrival and welcoming at the lounges, no VIP's were identified or brought to the attention of the officials present to perform this function. This was in contrast to the listing of the flight on the Mission Board as a VIP flight. After the landing of Flight JAI 9900, Colonel Visser noted in the interview with him that he, Colonel Fredrikson and Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson had "agreed that the flight should never have landed there". It is ironic that Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson could agree with the observation of Colonel Visser in light of the fact that she was party from inception to the planning of this visit. Colonel Visser also noted that no celebrations had ever taken place upon the arrival of a foreign flight at the base in his recollection.

The Immigration Act requires that civilians entering the country present themselves physically with their passports to the Immigration officials. This was not done, as Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson and the "Indian delegation" facilitated the processing of the passports as a batch in the absence of the visitors. These people were therefore accorded, in keeping with the legend, the diplomatic privilege of having their passports processed in their absence in addition to the use of the two red carpets and officials to welcome them.

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The failure to conduct customs formalities arising from the absence of the SARS at the base was an infringement of the Customs and Excise Act of 1964.

3.3 Post-Arrival Phase

Despite the requirement that the flight be issued with a Foreign Operators Permit prior to arrival, this was not done in the case of Flight JAI 9900. It was confirmed by the Department of Transport that no application was brought by the operator for the FOP. The absence of an FOP on arrival resulted in SACAA levying a fine of R80 000 on the airline. This represents an infringement of civil aviation regulations and a condition of the flight clearance

A range of concerns arise from the involvement of the SAPS and a private security company in transporting the visitors to and from Sun City. The predisposition of the SAPS officers involved in the operation left much to be desired. There was no attempt to determine the identities of the individuals providing route protection and escort; there was also no attempt to verify the vehicle licence plates or their use of blue lights. It is clear from subsequent arrests that members of the SAPS and Metro Police were moonlighting during this operation. The use of official firearms during the operation is an infringement of the Firearms Control Act. The use of false vehicle number plates was an infringement of the Road Traffic Act. The use of an unregistered private security company was an infringement of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority Act (PSIRA). The use of fitted blue and red lights in private security vehicles was also illegal, especially in the context of the existence of the so-called "Blue Light Gang". In addition, Major-General Taloe of SAPS found two BMW's fitted with blue lights. He also found three VW Golf GTI's and one Isuzu Bakkie which were fitted with blue lights. These belong to a civilian who as such is not entitled to have his vehicles fitted with blue lights. Furthermore, this individual was the subject of various criminal investigations that were subsequently dropped. The charges that had been proffered included two cases of impersonating a police officer and one of fraud.

The investigations conducted by the SAPS into the above matters indicate irregular invoicing of the event organiser using the name of a company that does not exist. It can be surmised that this could have taken place to take certain business transactions off the company's books and evade tax obligations, a common trait in organised crime.

The investigation reveals a number of discrepancies with the diplomatic passport numbers for certain of the visitors that were submitted by Sahara to the South African High Commission in New Delhi, and the actual passports used by these individuals. This matter is under investigation. Further, it has been determined that one of the visitors listed as crew did not leave the Republic with the rest of the visiting group, but is still in the country. This too is the subject of an investigation. Both are extremely irregular and leave much to be desired in the context of national security.

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The reference to an invitation from the Free State Provincial Government was opaque, as no member of this party travelled to the Free State for any such meeting. However, an Indian State Minister was received by the Free State MEC for Agriculture three days prior to the arrival of the Gupta wedding party; this Indian Minister therefore arrived and departed from South Africa completely separate from the Gupta wedding party, despite attending the wedding at Sun City.

The Indian High Commission then stated that the seven Ministers visited Cape Town prior to departing from the Republic on an Emirates flight from there. This raises a question as to compliance with the visa conditions and adherence to the provisions of the Immigration Act. This matter is work in progress.

3.4 Exit Phase

During the exit phase, procedures that would normally apply, and those instructed by the extended NICOC Principals Meeting of 1 May 2013, were partially complied with. Not all those who arrived with the flight departed on the outgoing flight; and SARS had not acted against the pilot for failing to comply within three hours of landing with the requirement that he inform SARS of the same in line with Section 7(1A) of the Customs and Excise Act of 1964. Jet Airways must be familiar with these conditions as they operated in South Africa until 2012.

4. CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

The findings of the Investigating Team are the following:

- 4.1 In February 2013 the Gupta family approached the Airports Company South Africa and requested landing rights and an elaborate reception for the wedding party. This would have disrupted the functioning of O.R. Tambo International Airport at the time of landing, particularly the operations of the National Immigration Branch at the airport. As a result, this was turned down. In March 2013 the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and her advisor were approached by the Gupta family on different occasions. On 3 April 2013 this request was also turned down. The Gupta family then resorted to the use of the diplomatic channel with the support of an individual in the Indian High Commission who re-designated the wedding entourage as an official delegation to enable them to use the Air Force Base Waterkloof under the cover of diplomatic privilege. It is an undisputed fact that there was no official Note Verbale from the Indian High Commission to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, and therefore due process was not followed. An individual in the Indian High Commission communicated directly with individuals at the Air Force Command Post. The collusion of officials resulted in the irregular approval of the flight clearance.

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- 4.2 Members of the National Executive were not required to issue any instructions, did not issue any instructions, and did not create the impression that they ought to have issued any instructions. This is evident in information at our disposal.
- 4.3 The aircraft in question was cleared for landing and the correct clearance procedures were followed, but based on false pretences as a result of the manipulation of the process by the Gupta family, individuals in the Indian High Commission, Chief of State Protocol Ambassador V.B. Koloane, and Officer Commanding Movement Control at the base, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Anderson, who shared a common purpose and acted in concert. This had the potential of damaging the good diplomatic and deep historical relations South Africa enjoys with India on the bilateral, multilateral, international and BRICS levels.
- 4.4 There are seven functions of the Air Force Base Waterkloof. They are operations; training flights; VVIP flights; foreign heads of state, envoys and dignitaries; registered military aircraft; diversion airfield for commercial aircraft; and conducting air shows.
- 4.5 As a result of the nature of these functions, the Air Force Base Waterkloof handles both civilian and military aircraft. This notwithstanding, the landing of the flight was a direct result of manipulation of processes and was undesirable.
- 4.6 The Air Force Base Waterkloof is a strategic military base that resorts under the Defence Act, Act 44 of 1957. The Air Force Base Waterkloof is not a National Key Point and is ~~not governed by the National Key Points Act, Act 102 of 1980~~, which is managed by the SAPS. This being a strategic military base, which also serves as an entry point into South Africa, it has even more stringent security measures.
- 4.7 The landing of Flight JAI 9900 following the exercise of undue influence had the potential to compromise the credibility of the Government of the Republic, and could have caused severe reputational damage to the state itself. The exercise of this undue influence undermined good governance, legislative stipulations, regulations, departmental protocols and standard operating procedures.
- 4.8 The activities of Ambassador Koloane and Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson were a serious dereliction of duty in that they were advancing the objectives of this project to the detriment of their official responsibilities. Their activities also indicate the bringing to bear of undue influence on state officials, systems, equipment and infrastructure. This influence happened despite the denial of the exercise of undue influence by the legal representative of the Gupta family. The roles of the two individuals had a similar effect in

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that due to their seniority and knowledge of departmental systems and processes in their respective areas, they both grossly abused and undermined these processes.

- 4.9 All requirements in terms of health clearances, baggage scanning and a firearms check were complied with.
- 4.10 The use of private security vehicles to ferry disembarking passengers from the aircraft to the lounges was a security breach.
- 4.11 The use of red carpets to welcome the arriving guests was not in line with protocol prescriptions, which require that these are used to welcome visiting Heads of State and/or Government, the Minister of Defence and other senior diplomatic visitors only.
- 4.12 Further to the above deviations, there were two additional deviations from normal DIRCO processes in this instance: there was no review and/or recommendation from the Political Desk in DIRCO on this particular request; and the interdepartmental coordination process that normally ensues did not take place. In its stead the Chief of State Protocol facilitated a visit for the Indian High Commission and the service provider to the base.
- 4.13 The Chief of State Protocol was assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel Christine Anderson, Officer Commanding Movement Control at Air Force Base Waterkloof. By calling Sergeant-Major Ntshisi at the Air Force Command Post on 9 April 2013, she inverted command and control and unduly influenced the processing of the clearance. She is in a Level 4 post that gets instructions from Level 3. She abused her rank on Sergeant-Major Ntshisi when she said he could go ahead with issuing the clearance. She was just supposed to await the decision of the Air Force Command Post on that application.
- 4.14 In light of the challenges faced during the landing, including poor visibility as a result of cloud cover, as well as the fact that landing guidance systems on the runway are being reconfigured, the situation held potentially catastrophic consequences had there been an unforeseen incident or accident involving the wedding party.
- 4.15 The activities of some of the persons involved were driven by the undesirable practice of the exercise of undue influence, and abuse of higher office. These activities posed a threat to the culture of professionalism that ought to characterise a caring and professional public service rooted in the Batho Pele principle. The incident is antithetical to the notion of a capable state and the requirement that it be served by professional public servants with foresight to understand the implications of their conduct for the reputation of the state.

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- 4.16 While the flight was in South African airspace, all procedures, protocols and instructions from air traffic control were complied with. The dramatised reports in the media, including social media, about the flight taking a tour over South African cities and disrupting air traffic are therefore unfounded.
- 4.17 The police, in terms of SSAREA, having initially refused to police the wedding as a private matter, were within their rights to treat the matter as requiring police involvement. However, the lack of involvement of other departments deprived them of information and better insight into this wedding. Consequently, the SAPS in the North-West Province developed a plan for the protection of the event, although there is concern at their failure to report to the National Commissioner, who would have activated the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Structure (NatJOINTS) if deemed necessary, in keeping with established protocols. This could have provided another opportunity for the relevant role players to review the nature of the event and policing plans.
- 4.18 The involvement of law enforcement agencies under the auspices and leadership of the South African Police Services, in providing convoy protection services was authorised, but involved officers who were moonlighting contrary to regulations. The officials from the Metro Police who carried their firearms irregularly to protect the event are only authorised to bear their firearms within their respective Metro jurisdictions. Their use in this instance was a violation of regulations. Some of them also drove vehicles that were fitted illegally with blue lights.
- 4.19 ~~In the interest of the safety of all road users and taking into account that 121 vehicles~~ were deployed by the event organiser, it was necessary that law enforcement officers take charge of the convoy to Sun City. However, due to the lack of vigilance of the SAPS members deployed for escort duty, who did not identify the drivers as non-SAPS members, they placed reliance on those drivers. This made it possible for the cars fitted with illegal blue-lights to push people off the road, cause delays and inconvenience other road users. The public outcry that followed was therefore justified.
- 4.20 The following transgressions of the law took place, amongst others:
- 4.20.1 SAPS Act, Act 68 of 1995: Contravening of Section 67(2)(a): Conspiring or inducing or attempting to induce a member not to perform duty or act in conflict with his duty; and Section 68: Falsely pretending to be a police officer.
- 4.20.2 Road Traffic Act, Act 93 of 1996: Section 89(3) and Section 68(1) and (2): Use of false registration.
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- 4.20.3 Companies Act, Act 71 of 2008: Section 214(1)(b): Person with a fraudulent purpose knowingly provided false or misleading information in any circumstances under this Act; and Section 214(1)(c): Knowingly a party to an act of omission by a company calculated to defraud a creditor or employee of the company, or a holder of the company securities, or with another fraudulent purpose.
- 4.20.4 Firearms Control Act, Act 60 of 2000: Section 120(1)(a): Failure to apply for renewal of a licence/permit/certificate authorisation before end of period determined by the Minister.
- 4.20.5 Common Law Crimes: Fraud, falsely pretending or misrepresenting the existence of a company.
- 4.20.6 Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority Act, Act 56 of 2001: Section 20(1): Conducting of security service contrary to the Act.
- 4.21 The following cases have been registered:
- 4.21.1 Sun City CAS 16/05/2013: Contravention of the Firearms Control Act.
- 4.21.2 Sun City CAS 18/05/2013: Contravention of the National Road Traffic Act.
- 4.21.3 Sun-City-CAS 19/05/2013: Contravention of the PSIRA Act.
- 4.21.4 Sun City CAS 20/05/2013: Contravention of the PSIRA Act.
- 4.21.5 Lyttelton CAS 71/05/2013: Contravention of the South African Police Act.
- 4.22 It is now confirmed that all helicopters used in the operation were organised and funded by the Gupta family, and were neither SAPS nor SANDF helicopters. All of the black BMW's used in the convoys were hired from a private company.
- 4.23 Overall, the total deployment of government personnel during the operation was 194 persons and 88 vehicles. 296 private security officers were deployed at the expense of the event organiser. The organisers also deployed two fixed-wing aircraft and seven helicopters to ferry their guests from the base to Sun City. This was authorised as a package linked to the already-issued clearance for Flight JAI 9900.

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- 4.24 It is commendable, notwithstanding the manipulation by a few, that public servants in affected government departments and structures raised concerns without fear, favour or prejudice, some of them repeatedly, as to what was transpiring. However, their concerns were neither addressed, nor acted upon by those in positions of authority over them bent on manipulating the system.
- 4.25 Overall, the system for the management of foreign visits and the requisite permits, policies and procedures are in place and functioning. That is why flights arrive and depart on a daily basis without incident. The breach in this instance was a consequence of manipulation by the responsible persons, who contemptuously manipulated the system to advance the wedding objectives at all costs.
- 4.26 SANRAL and SAPS reports reveal gross violations of the Road Traffic Act in that a number of the Range Rovers used shared the same registration numbers; three black BMWs had false registration plates; and two Mercedes Benz shared registration numbers. These and other criminal activities uncovered in this investigation are a manifestation of a deep-seated organised crime culture waiting to be unleashed on the country.

5. CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS

The Investigating Team provides the following recommendations for consideration:

- 5.1. All affected departments and entities must complete their investigations into this matter as soon as possible to ensure that justice is seen to be done, and the required disciplinary measures are fully implemented where deemed necessary. Criminal cases involving public officials or private persons must, as a matter of priority, be pursued to their logical conclusion.
- 5.2. To avoid any overlap of mandates and confusion over the management, command and control of bases including Air Force Base Waterkloof, it is not desirable to declare these National Key Points, as it would subject them to the control of the SAPS. These are military installations that must continue to resort under the Defence Act and serve the existing seven functions listed in paragraph 4.1.4 above.
- 5.3. Government, led by the Department of Public Service and Administration, should develop and implement a public service awareness campaign to discourage the negative culture of name dropping in the form of improper use of names of the National Executive

in the public sector. In addition, the definition of acts of misconduct should be amended across government to include name dropping as gross misconduct.

6. CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the landing of flight JAI 9900 at Air Force Base Waterkloof has brought to the fore serious issues that need immediate attention. These include the identified culture of undue influence, underpinned by poor ethical conduct and a lack of professionalism described in this report.

We believe that the unified public voice which condemned the incident, together with decisive government action, serves as a useful basis for the development of a partnership between our people and their government in the fight to combat crime and corruption in our country.

Notwithstanding the negative findings, the work of the Investigating Team has brought to light the many public servants who conscientiously and faithfully perform their duties and daily tasks, and whose work is a credit to the country that they serve.

end





the doj & cd

Department:
Justice and Constitutional Development
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

CONFIDENTIAL

Received on 08/05/2013 J 484
22h30

Ambassador J MATJILA
Director-General: DIRCO

INVESTIGATION INTO UNAUTHORISED LANDING OF THE JET AIRWAYS A330-200, REGISTRATION VT-JWQ AIRCRAFT AT WATERKLOOF AIR FORCE BASE

1. On 2013 May 2, the Extended JCPS Ministerial Cluster appointed the Directors-General to undertake an investigation on the Unauthorised Landing of the Jet Airways Aircraft at Waterkloof Air Force Base under the Chairpersonship of Mr DT DLOMO, the acting Director General of the State Security Agency. This Task Team has strict timeframes within which to complete its report for consideration of the Ministers.
2. While recognising all your rights in terms of the Public Service Act and/or Police Service Act and or Defence Act whichever one is applicable to you, the Task Team – working fully within the provision of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa - hereby requests you to avail before the Task Team the following:
 - 2.1 a sworn statement or affidavit or attestation
 - 2.2 all documents in your possession on the matter at hand;
 - 2.3 a written chronology of events per your understanding;
 - 2.4 any standard operating procedures you are aware of on dealing with such matters;
 - 2.4 your person to answer to any questions the Investigation Team may ask on the matter or as follow-up to the documents you will submit.
3. In the event you, as participant to this investigation, so require, you are welcome to consult at your expense. However, as unnecessary as this is in the view of the team in the immediate term, it should be within the timeframe set in paragraph 4 below.


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INVESTIGATION INTO UNAUTHORISED LANDING OF THE JET AIRWAYS A330-200, REGISTRATION VT-JWQ AIRCRAFT AT WATERKLOOF AIR FORCE BASE

4. I attach a list of questions which I request you to respond to urgently and to submit to the Task team before close of business on Thursday, 2013 May 09. Should it be so required, the Task Team may require your presence at its meeting on Friday or Saturday, 10 and 11 May 2013. To this end, please be on standby as the Task Team may call you telephonically.

Thank you for your cooperation


TN SINDANE

DIRECTOR-GENERAL: JUSTICE & CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRPERSON OF THE JCPS CLUSTER

8/5/13

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QUESTIONS FOR AMBASSADOR KOLOANE

A. Pre-arrival phase

1. How did Ambassador Koloane receive the request for the private wedding? Was this communicated to DIRCO Minister and Director-General?
2. Who else was involved in the initial interaction with Ambassador Koloane?
3. As Chief of State Protocol was what was he expected to do? What did he actually do with the request?
4. When did Ambassador Koloane meet with Mr Mike Ramagoma? What was the purpose of the meeting? What was the outcome of the meeting with Mr Ramagoma?
5. How many times did he go back to Mr Ramagoma? Why?
6. When did Ambassador Koloane meet ACSA?
7. What prompted Ambassador Koloane to meet with Indian High Commissioner?
8. When Ambassador Koloane received the private request, how far were you able to pursue it?
9. When did Ambassador Koloane become aware of the transition from a family visit to an official/VIP visit? Did he play any role in the transition process?
10. What did Ambassador Bruce Koloane say to Mr Ramagoma?
11. Who met whom at the Oliver Regional Tambo International Airport (ORTIA)?
12. Who decided ORTIA? And how was this communicated?
13. What airport did the Guptas specifically ask for in the first place?
14. Who suggested an alternative to ORTIA? What was the technical basis for this?
15. What was communicated to the Guptas before the matter went quiet? By whom?
16. Who prompted Ambassador Koloane to go back to Mr Ramagoma?
17. What did Mr Ramagoma say to Ambassador Koloane?
18. Who instructed Captain Kully (Military Attaché) from Indian High Commission to approach Waterkloof Air Force Base? When did this happen?
19. Did somebody suggest to the Indian High Commission the term "delegation visit" be used? If so who? And why was this suggested?
20. Who stated that ministers would be arriving?
21. There is a need for clarification on the issue of the India-Africa Summit. Was it even planned? Did the minister visit the Free State Provincial Government?
22. Why was there a transition from a Gupta request to an Indian High Commission request?
23. Is the Indian High Commissioner related to the Guptas given his surname? How is the Higher Commissioner related to Minister Gupta in India?
24. Has Minister Gupta used Waterkloof Air Force Base before, using the same charter company?
25. Did Ambassador Koloane see the flight plan?
26. Was Ambassador Koloane aware that airbus A 330-200 was given clearance to land?
27. What was Ambassador Koloane asked when Indian High Commissioner called him?

28. Who at Indian High Commission asked Ambassador Koloane for processing assistance? What was the ambassador's response? What did Ambassador Koloane understand the request to mean?
29. What are the details of the 24 April 2013 meeting at Waterkloof air base? Are there minutes? Who was present from the Indian High Commission?
30. On all clearances the reason given is "delegation". Why did departmental officials get the impression it is an official delegation?

B. Arrival phase

1. How was Ambassador Koloane informed of the landing?
2. Did he know it was landing at Waterkloof?
3. What time did the alibus arrive?
4. What did Ambassador Koloane do upon arrival at Waterkloof?
5. How many vehicles were at Waterkloof?
6. How did they access the base? Who authorised access?
7. Who were the 150 who arrived ahead of time? Is Ambassador Koloane aware of them?
8. When did they arrive?
9. Where did they go?
10. When did they leave the country?
11. 2020 left ORTIA, High Commissioner said 7 went to Cape Town. When did they leave Cape Town? Was Ambassador Koloane aware of the nature of the 7 Indian Ministers trip to Cape Town? Was protocol assistance requested?
12. Why were SARS, agriculture and DIRCO not present?
13. It an anomaly to have a Chief of State Protocol to be present but not with his subordinates to help with the guests.

C. Transportation phase

1. What security measures were put in place with SAPS for the convoys going to Sun City?

D. Wedding phase

1. Was protection provided to the Indian Ministers? If so by whom? If not why not?



POLICY FOR INCOMING INTERNATIONAL VISITS

1. INTRODUCTION

The Branch: State Protocol is responsible for the management, organization, co-ordination, and arrangement of all protocol arrangements including logistics pertaining to visits to the Republic of South Africa by foreign Heads of State/Government, former Heads of State, Royalty, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, their spouses and selectively, Heads of Regional Organisations and their Deputies e.g. Secretary General of the UN, O/AU, etc

The Branch: State Protocol is the sole custodian for logistics of visits conducted by the afore-mentioned dignitaries and shall act as the nodal point for all information pertaining to such visits.

2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of the Branch: State Protocol is to render a consistent and professional service to Guests of Honour.

3. CATEGORIES OF VISITS

3.1 State Visits

A state visit is an official visit with full ceremonial honours by a foreign Head of State, and takes place at the invitation of the President of the Republic of South Africa at the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The duration of the state visit shall not exceed three days (two nights).

A state visit shall include the following standard programme items:

- arrival ceremony at the airport consisting of:
 - flag
 - red carpet
 - receiving line (Chief/Deputy Chief of State Protocol, senior Department officials, senior Provincial office-bearers)
 - silent Guard of Honour
- official welcoming ceremony at Tuynhuys or Union Buildings (national salute, 21 gun salute, inspection of the Guard, national anthems, receiving line)
- one on one meeting with the President
- extended bilateral with Cabinet Ministers and senior officials
- media briefing
- courtesy call by the Deputy President
- state banquet
- Address to the Joint Sitting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (when in session)
- Visits to sites of historical and/or political significance

A Cabinet Minister, appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, accompanies the Head of State throughout his/her visit.

3.2 Official Visit

An official visit is a visit by a foreign Head of State/Government, Deputy Head of State/Government, member of the Royal Family, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the invitation of the President, Deputy President or Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa. The duration of an official visit shall not exceed three days (two nights)

An official visit conducted by a Head of State/Government shall include the following standard programme items:

- arrival ceremony at the airport (as per state visit)
- receiving line: Heads of State/Government - Chief/Deputy Chief of State Protocol, senior Department officials, senior Provincial office-bearers
- receiving line: Ministers of Foreign Affairs – senior Department officials
- official welcoming ceremony at Tuynhuys or Union Buildings: Heads of State/Government (Guard of Honour – no inspection, national salute, national anthems, receiving line – NB: no 21 gun salute)
- one on one meeting with the President
- extended bilateral with Cabinet Ministers and senior officials
- media briefing
- courtesy call by the Deputy President
- official banquet

3.3 Working Visit

A working visit is undertaken at the initiative of the foreign Head of State/Government, Deputy Head of State/Government, Member of the Royal Family or Minister of Foreign Affairs at their own initiative and without a formal invitation from their South African counterparts. These visits however, require the agreement of their relevant counterpart. The duration of an official visit shall not exceed three days (two nights).

The Resident Mission, in consultation with the relevant Political Desk, shall determine the nature of the programme. The following ceremonies shall be included in the programme:

- arrival ceremony at the airport – red carpet, flag & receiving line only
- receiving line: Heads of State/Government - Chief /Deputy Chief of State Protocol, senior Department officials, senior Provincial office-bearers
- receiving line: Ministers of Foreign Affairs – senior Department officials
- media briefing

3.4 Private Visits

Private visits by foreign Heads of State/Government, Royalty or Ministers of Foreign Affairs are undertaken for affairs not connected with matters of office, e.g. private business, for medical or holiday purposes. An extension of a state, working or official visit beyond the set period is also categorized as private.

- arrival ceremony at the airport – red carpet, flag & receiving line only
- receiving line: Heads of State/Government - Chief /Deputy Chief of State Protocol, senior Department officials, senior Provincial office-bearers
- receiving line: Ministers of Foreign Affairs – senior Department officials

3.5 Special Visits

A special visit is undertaken by foreign Heads of State/Government, Deputy Heads of State/Government, Royalty, Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Cabinet Ministers, at the invitation of the Republic of South Africa, to represent their country at a specific occasion, e.g. the inauguration of a Head of State, international conferences and summits.

3.6 Bi-national and Joint Commissions

Bi-national and Joint Commissions are undertaken by mutual agreement between the participating countries. The status of the Guest of Honour's visit is classified as a working visit in terms of courtesies that are extended by the South African Government.

Bi-national and Joint Commissions shall contain the following ceremonial items:

- opening and closing sessions
- media briefing

3.7 Processes facilitated by the President, Deputy President and former Heads of State

Visits undertaken by dignitaries as identified in point 1 in order to partake in processes initiated and facilitated by the President, Deputy President or former Presidents. The projects include:

- African Union
- Burundi Peace Process
- Democratic Republic of Congo Peace Process
- New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

3.8 Conferences and Summits

Dignitaries, as identified in par. 1, that attend international conferences and summits held within the Republic of South Africa are the guests of the facilitator of the event. The responsibility of the Chief Directorate: Protocol Programmes encompasses the following:

- Provide a Protocol liaison officer to supervise and advise the project team with regard to Protocol
- Supervision and co-ordination of the rendering of Protocol services during the event
- co-ordination of arrivals and departures
- facilitating provision of security services

3.8 Special Envoy

Representatives appointed by their Head of State/Government in order to convey a message to the President or Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa. This visit is taken at the initiative of the visiting country.

4. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT

- 4.1 Courtesies extended by the South African Government to visiting dignitaries, as per the categories defined in point 3, are as follows:
- Security by the VIP Protection Unit, South African Police Services (SAPS)
 - Facilitation via the State Protocol Lounge, Johannesburg International Airport, and via corresponding facilities at other ports of entry, including Airforce Bases
 - Transport
 - Accommodation
- 4.2 The A-Suite refers to a particular part of the official delegation that the South African Government takes financial responsibility for. It is the prerogative of the visiting delegation to determine the composition of the A-Suite. The following, however, needs to be taken into cognisance:
- the A-Suite must include the Principal
 - there shall be only one A-Suite per visit, i.e. Ministers accompanying a Head of State/Government that are not determined by the Resident Mission as part of the A-Suite will not be treated as separate delegations
 - the composition of the A-Suite shall remain constant throughout the visit
 - members of the Resident Mission do not form part of the A-Suite
- 4.3 The B-Suite refers to the rest of the delegation and is the responsibility of the Resident Mission and advance team, both financially and logistically.
- 4.4 The courtesies provided by the South African Government are extended according to the following categories, which are based on international practice:
- | | |
|---|------------------|
| ▪ State Visits | 1 + 11 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ State Visit with a spouse | 2 + 10 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Official Visit by Head of State/
Government | 1 + 9 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Official Visit with a spouse | 2 + 8 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Official visit by Minister of Foreign
Affairs | 1 + 4 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Official visit by Minister of Foreign
Affairs with spouse | 2 + 3 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Official visit by Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs | 1 + 2 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Official visit by Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs with spouse | 2 + 1 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Working Visit by Head of State/
Government | 1 + 4 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Working Visit by Head of State/
Government with spouse | 2 + 3 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Working Visit by Minister of Foreign
Affairs | 1 + 2 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Working visit by Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs | 1 + 2 (A-Suite) |
| ▪ Special projects and processes | 1 + 1 (A-Suite) |

- 4.3 Dignitaries, as identified in point 1, that engage in private visits or transit through the Republic of South Africa shall be accorded the following courtesies:
- Security by the VIP Protection Unit, South African Police Services (SAPS)
 - Facilitation via the State Protocol Lounge, Johannesburg International Airport, and via corresponding facilities at other ports of entry, including Airforce Bases

5. FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THE A-SUITE

The Government of the Republic of South Africa is responsible for the following:

5.1 Accommodation

- Branch: State Protocol and the advance party of the visiting country mutually agree on the nature of the accommodation.
- The courtesies provided by the South African Government include:
 - Accommodation for the A-Suite
 - Accommodation includes all meals, laundry, dry cleaning, soft drinks and local telephone calls and facsimile messages.
- In Pretoria, the Diplomatic Guesthouse or suitable hotel accommodation is used to accommodate. In Cape Town and Durban, suitable hotel accommodation is provided.
- Hotel accommodation is reserved as follows:

- Head of State/Government	Presidential Suite
- Ministers	Executive Suite (i.e. suite with separate lounge)
- Deputy Ministers	Junior Suite
- Officials	standard room
- The Branch: State Protocol is also responsible for providing accommodation as defined above for the assigned South African protocol officials and for the principal South African VIP Protection officer.

5.2 Transport

- The secured motorcade provided by the South African Government is as follows:
 - A non-armoured vehicle for the VVIP. The provision of an armoured vehicle is subject to the outcome of a threat analysis of the principal conducted by National Intelligence Agency and subject to the approval of payment by the Director-General
 - Spare non-armoured VVIP vehicle
 - A VVIP vehicle for the spouse, should a separate programme to that of the principal be followed
 - VIP vehicles as determined by the composition of the A-Suite. This shall amount to a maximum of four (4) sedan vehicles.

- One protocol vehicle for use of both RSA and visiting protocol officials
- One luggage vehicle for the VVIP
- All vehicles within the secured motorcade are driven by SAPS VIP Protection Unit officers
- No vehicles forming part of the secured motorcade, with the exception of that provided for the Spouse, shall be utilised for movements separate to that of the secured motorcade.
- Vehicles are provided according to the following categories:
 - Head of State/Government Mercedes S-Class or equivalent
 - Minister of Foreign Affairs Mercedes E-Class or equivalent
 - Other Ministers Mercedes C-Class or equivalent
 - Officials/Protocol Toyota Camry or equivalent
- The resident Mission is responsible for the handling and transportation of the rest of the A-suite luggage.

The Government of the Republic of South Africa bears no responsibility for the following:

- Air fare
- Landing and parking fees of visiting aircraft
- Additional car rental
- International telephone calls, telex/facsimile communication
- Personal entertainment, including hotel minibar, in-house videos and expenses of a personal nature.
- Official functions hosted by the Guest of Honour
- Accommodation and transport for the B-suite
- Private security services
- Visits to game parks and other leisure resorts for private purposes

NB: Such charges should be settled during the course of the visit. Should the charges not be settled on departure, they would be directed to the resident mission of the visiting country for payment.

Any items beyond the standard package offered to the Guests of Honour is by mutual agreement between Branch: State Protocol and representatives of the visiting country.

The principle of reciprocity is dealt with on the bases of individual cases, and is done only in consultation between the Branch: State Protocol, the relevant Political Desk and The Presidency.

6. SECURITY

The security of the Guest of Honour is the responsibility of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

6.1 Firearms

- Five side arms and sixteen rounds per side arm will be allowed into the Republic of South Africa. Request for additional arms are to be forwarded to the Minister of Safety and Security by the visiting head of security prior to arrival in South Africa.
- No automatic weapons will be allowed.
- No assault rifles will be allowed
- Weapon details, including the calibre and make thereof, and passport details of the bearers should be submitted to State Protocol timeously for the purpose of obtaining permits.
- All firearms imported for the purpose of protecting the Guest of Honour must under no circumstances be left at the resident Mission.
- No firearms are allowed in the offices and official residences of the President and Deputy President; Parliament; State Protocol Lounge and in the passenger cabins of aircraft
- Permits for bearing firearms will only be effective as of the arrival of the Guest of Honour and revoked after his/her departure from the Republic of South Africa.

7. ENTRY REQUIREMENTS

7.1 Immigration

To facilitate a smooth and rapid clearance, full names and passport particulars of all people travelling with the Guest of Honour must be furnished to State Protocol fourteen (14) working days before the visit for onward transmission to the Department of Home Affairs.

7.1.1 Visas / entry permits

All members of the travelling party are required to have a valid visa or entry permit unless the visiting country holds a visa exemption agreement with the Republic of South Africa.

7.1.2 Immigration procedures

In terms of the Immigration Act 13/2002, all persons must present themselves to an Immigration Officer when entering or leaving the Republic of South Africa.

As a courtesy to visiting dignitaries, the Department of Home Affairs exempts members of the A-Suite only from presenting themselves to an Immigration official. The responsibility is delegated to a Foreign Affairs Protocol Official, to whom the A-Suite must present themselves and who presents identification documents to Immigration Officials on their behalf.

7.1.3 The use of international airports

The Aliens Control Act of 1991, Sections 5(1) and 35(1)(c), stipulates that persons entering and leaving the Republic of South Africa must do so at the approved ports of entry.

The following airports, where Immigration services are rendered, may be used for international arrivals and departures:

- Bloemfontein
- Cape Town
- Durban
- Gateway (Pietersburg)
- Johannesburg
- Lanseria
- Nelspruit
- Pilanesburg
- Port Elizabeth
- Upington

The Minister of Home Affairs must be approached personally in all cases where persons wish to enter or leave the Republic of South Africa at airports other than those specified above, including Airforce Bases.

7.2 Health requirements

All visiting aircraft are subject to disinfection upon arrival.

Proof of inoculation against yellow fever is required for all members of the travelling party that are from, or have passed through, yellow fever endemic areas as stipulated by the World Health Organisation.

7.3 Customs

All media representatives must be in possession of working visas, as well as an international CARNET for the temporary transportation and clearance of photographic and TV Equipment.

8. GIFTS

Gifts are arranged in consultation with the relevant principals and are generally exchanged via the respective Protocol officials.

The procurement of gifts is performed by the Sub-directorate State Visits after consultation with the Political Desk. Items are forwarded to the Spousal Office for approval by Mrs Mbeki and are presented upon her approval only.

9. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

9.1 State Protocol

- The Chief of State Protocol or the Deputy Chief of State Protocol is the Project Manager

9.1.1 Sub-directorate: State Visits

- Manage and coordinate protocol logistics for the A-Suite in consultation with the Mission and the advance party.
- Package, manage and prepare the official programme in close consultation with The Presidency, Ministry and relevant Political Desk

- Act as official liaison between all role-players
- Facilitate project management meetings
- Forward delegation lists to all role-players
- Organize site inspections in consultation with VIP Protection Unit and the advance team of the visiting country
- Liaise with role-players regarding the arrival and departure of the Guest of Honour and the A-suite Airforce Bases and South African airports other than Johannesburg International Airport
- Organize appropriate accommodation and transport for the Guest of Honour and the A-Suite.
- Procure gifts for onward transmission to the Presidential Household
- Forward guest lists to The Presidency in the event of state and official visits
- Arrange clearances and landing permission for official aircraft of the visiting dignitary
- Arrange clearances of firearms of the visiting country
- Arrange debriefing/evaluation subsequent to the visit

9.1.2 Sub-directorate: Protocol Ceremonial

- Manage and coordinate ceremonial functions (banquets, signing and award ceremonies) for Ministers of Foreign Affairs and their Deputies.
- Co-ordinate opening and closing sessions of Bi-national and Joint Commissions

9.1.3 State Protocol Lounge

- Manage and co-ordinate arrivals and departures at all airports
- Facilitate the A-Suite at Johannesburg International Airport

9.1.4 Presidential and Diplomatic Guesthouses

- Host dignitaries resident in the Guesthouses
- Co-ordinate and cater for functions held at the Guesthouses and Tuynhuys

9.1.5 Intergovernmental and Provincial Protocol

- Liaise with Provinces regarding visits
- Request participation in visits by Premiers and Mayors timeously

9.1.6 Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges

- Liaise with Customs regarding clearances

9.2 The Presidency

- Attend preparatory meetings with all role-players
- Confirm appointments and movements of The Presidency
- Ceremonial aspects of visits conducted by Heads of State/Government and their Deputies, i.e. arrival ceremony at the airport, official welcome, bestowal of orders
- Official and state banquets in honour of Heads of State/Government and their Deputies
- Approval of gifts presented to Heads of State/Government, their Deputies and Spouses
- Approval of programme for Spouses to Heads of State/Government

- The Chancery of Orders
- Prepare the award of a South African Order to a visiting dignitary after consultation with the Ministry and relevant Political Desk
- Presidential media briefings and press conferences
- Prepare photographic albums presented to dignitaries subsequent to state visits

9.3 RSA Mission

- Inform Head Office of the proposed visit
- Inform Head Office of unscheduled visits
- Coordinate communication between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the visiting country.
- Prepare and forward first draft programme to the relevant Political Desk
- Advise on political, cultural and social matters pertaining to the visit.
- Head of Mission to accompany the Guest of Honour throughout the visit.

9.4 Political Desk

- Attend preparatory meetings with all role-players
- Submit a draft programme approved by the relevant Deputy Director-General to State Protocol
- Manage and coordinate information on substance pertaining to the visit with relevant role-players, including the preparation of all briefing documents
- Circulate background information to the project team
- Brief the Intelligence community regarding substantive issues
- Submit approved substantive changes that impact on logistical arrangements to Branch: State Protocol
- Inform the RSA Mission regarding outcomes of preparatory meetings and decisions made by the project team
- Confirm all appointments of the Guest of Honour
- Submit officials, including the Deputy Director-General, to greet the Guest of Honour on arrival and departure
- Submit Cabinet Ministers to accompany Heads of State during a state visit
- Submit Cabinet Ministers to participate in various aspects of the programme
- Brief Cabinet Ministers regarding substantive issues
- Brief Cabinet Ministers regarding their roles within a visit
- Submit requests to the Ministry regarding joint sessions of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces
- Draft media statements
- Prepare agreements to be signed
- Submit prepared agreements to Sub-directorate: Protocol Ceremonial a minimum of two (2) days prior to the ceremony
- Make arrangements for the SA Head of Mission while in South Africa.
- Provide Branch: State Protocol with guest lists, comprising business and social personalities, for official and state banquets for onward transmission to The Presidency

9.5 Media (Department of Foreign Affairs and The Presidency)

- Attend preparatory meetings with all role-players

- Produce media briefing documents and media strategy for the visit
- Arrange press briefings and produce Press Releases pertaining to the visit
- Organize and manage Press Conferences and Photo Opportunities
- Liaise with GCIS (Government Communications and Information Service) regarding official photographer
- Coordinate and manage the movement of visiting media officials
- Coordinate and manage other media institutions covering the visit
- Manage accreditation and clearance of equipment for visiting country media and access for the visiting media to secured sites

9.6 Marketing

- Brand events
- Advise regarding and source entertainment
- Advise regarding places of interest

9.7 Department of Safety and Security

9.7.1 VIP Protections Services

- Provide security for visiting Heads of State/Government, Ministers and other VIPs
- Attend preparatory meetings with all role-players
- Liaise with National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and South African Secret Service (SASS) regarding updated threat assessments
- Determine and manage security package
- Manage secured motorcade
- Manage secured venues
- Liaise with Traffic authorities regarding deployment and operational issues
- Liaise with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) regarding the provision of ambulances

9.7.2 Border Police

- Police the transnational movement of persons and goods, including firearms, at international ports of entry
- Assist in the safekeeping, declaring and transportation of firearms aboard aircraft
- Facilitate the clearances of firearms

9.7.3 Metro Police

- Provide traffic assistance to Heads of State/Government and Regional Organisations

9.8 Department of Intelligence

9.8.1 National Intelligence Agency

- Conduct threat assessments of visiting dignitaries
- Forward threat assessments reports to VIP Protection Services and the Department of Foreign Affairs
- Brief VIP Protection Services and the Department of Foreign Affairs regarding substantive issues pertaining to domestic intelligence

9.8.2 South African Secret Service

- Conduct assessments of threats imported from the visiting dignitaries' countries of origin
- Brief VIP Protection Services and the Department of Foreign Affairs regarding substantive issues pertaining to international intelligence
- Provide VIP Protection Services and the Department of Foreign Affairs with profiles and Curricula Vitae of visiting dignitaries upon request

9.9 South African Airforce

- Provide overflight and landing clearances to visiting military and Presidential aircraft
- Facilitate arrivals and departures at Airforce Bases
- Provide secure facilities for visiting military and Presidential aircraft, including civilian aircraft under military call signs, of the visiting country at Airforce Bases

9.10 Airports Company of South Africa

- Facilitate arrivals and departures at commercial airports
- Provide VIP facilities at Cape Town and Durban airports
- Exempt luggage of Heads of State from being screened
- Facilitate access of officials to tarmac area in case of tarmac pick-up by arranging special tarmac permits for officials and vehicles

9.11 Department of Home Affairs: Immigration

- Facilitate the official delegation within the shortest time possible
- Provide tarmac clearance for the A-Suite upon request
- Liaise with the Minister of Home Affairs regarding arrivals and departures at non-international airports and Airforce Bases

9.12 South African Revenue Services : Customs

- Extend the courtesy of exempting the Guest of Honour and accompanying A-Suite from standard customs procedures
- Facilitate the official delegation within the shortest time possible
- Supervise the unloading of baggage from military or special aircraft
- Provide Customs services at Waterkloof and Ysterplaat Airforce Bases upon request

9.13 Department of Health

- Manage the adherence to health requirements at ports of entry

9.14 Cabinet Ministers

- Meet and greet Heads of State and their relevant counterparts upon arrival and departure
- Participate in official welcome ceremonies
- Participate in bilateral meetings as proposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and approved by the President
- Attend banquets upon invitation
- Accompany Heads of State during state visits as per nomination by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

9.15 Provinces (Premiers, Mayors and MEC's)

- Meet and greet upon arrival and departure
- Attend banquets upon invitation
- Accompany principals during visits to provincial projects

9.16 Parliament and the National Council of Provinces
awaiting inputs

9.17 Foreign Mission

- Arrange logistics for handling and transportation of A and B-suites luggage
- Arrange accommodation and other requirements for the B-suite.
- Arrange transport for movements of the A-Suite outside that of the secured motorcade
- Provide the delegation list, the CVs and bloodtypes of the Guests of Honour, musical scores of the National Anthems, a list of details pertaining to the aircraft of the Guest of Honour (when using an official/ private aircraft)
- Appoint a handling agent for maintenance, servicing and refuelling of private aircraft
- Arrange for installation of extra telephone lines in consultation with the local telephone service provider.
- Submit request for permission to State Protocol for use of any type of communication equipment (handheld radios and related equipment) to be forwarded to the relevant Ministry.
- Designate officials for passports and luggage handling
- Furnish the Subdirector: State Visits with names of officials requiring temporary airside permits at least 72 hours prior to the arrival of the Guest of Honour

10. ADVANCE TEAMS

The Sub-directorate: State Visits shall determine the programme for the visiting advance team in consultation with the Resident Mission and relevant role-players. As such, an advance team will only be received once an approved draft programme identifying all sites and role-players has been actioned by the project team.

An official of the relevant Political Desk and the Protocol project leader shall accompany the advance team on all site visits.

11. OFFICIAL PROGRAMME

- The Sub-directorate: State visits, in consultation with the advance party of the visiting country and the relevant Political Desk, manages, coordinates and produces the official programme of the visit in booklet form, printed in English.
- The final programme is to be approved by the relevant Deputy Director-General at least 72 hours prior to the arrival of the Guest of Honour
- Should the resident Mission print their own programme, great care should be taken to ensure that details correspond with the official one.
- Spousal programmes are compiled by the relevant Political Desk and the Sub-Directorate: State Visits, in consultation with the Mission and the Spousal Office, and will be included in the official booklet programme.



**GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF WATERKLOOF AIR FORCE BASE DURING
INCOMING VISITS BY HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT OR FOREIGN
MINISTERS AND DEPARTURES OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE DEPUTY
PRESIDENT**

Heads of State/Government and Foreign Ministers

1. Waterkloof Air Force Base can be used for the arrival/departure of the above category of guests during state, official or working visits.
2. Permission must be requested from Air Force Headquarters at fax no: 312-2525/2929 from Col. C Rabie. He can be contacted at tel: 312-2034
3. The following information must be obtained from the resident Mission and be forwarded to Air Force Headquarters timeously (At least a week prior to arrival):
 - 3.1 Make of aircraft
 - 3.2 Registration Number
 - 3.3 No of crew
 - 3.4 Day and time of arrival and departure
 - 3.5 Names of official or VIP meeting delegation
 - 3.6 Is catering required for return flight. There is a specific form for this – Please see attachment.
 - 3.7 Amount of fuel needed for return flight. The resident mission must make arrangements prior to the arrival of the VIP for payment (either in cash or Master Card) and must appoint a handling agent suggested by the Air Force.
 - 3.8 Does the aircraft have it's own stairs or must stairs be provided by Omar International, a handling agent assisting at Waterkloof. This can be very costly and resident Missions must be informed.
 - 3.9 Arrangements must also be made timeously for vehicles entering Waterkloof Air Force Base to meet guests. The registration numbers of the vehicles as well as the name of the drivers must be forwarded to Col I Smith, for information to Capt Van der Westhuizen at Waterkloof at: fax no 672-3038. (cell: 082 859 9991)
4. Advance visits can be arranged for advance teams for Waterkloof Air Force Base with Col. Smith. Please request Col. Smith to invite officials from Customs, Immigration and Health to an advance visit. This will prevent any difficulties occurring during the arrival.

Departures by the President and Deputy President on international flights

1. A protocol officer from State Visits (the anchorperson) is responsible for the departure of the President or Deputy President.
2. The protocol officer must continuously liaise with all parties (The Presidency, Airforce and PPU) to ensure that all arrangements are in place.
3. This official must be at Waterkloof Air Force Base one (1) hour prior to departure to ensure that the passport formalities are done, all the overflight clearances are in place, gifts and luggage are recorded and on board etc.
4. The Presidency informs the base of the final departure time and the base itself arranges for the Immigration official to be present.
5. The protocol officer must ensure that all other passengers board the aircraft prior to the Principal, then conduct the principal to the foot of the aircraft's stairs.
6. The protocol officer must remain at the base for at least 30 minutes after the departure of the President or the Deputy President.
7. The protocol officer is responsible for communicating the time of departure to the Protocol Project Leader, or the relevant SA Mission should a DFA Protocol officer not be in advance.
8. The President/Deputy President is met on return of international visits by the anchorperson, who is responsible for collecting the passports from the delegation and ensures that they are stamped by the Immigration official. The passports are returned to State Visits and relevant line departments for safekeeping.

Air transport requests

Should air transport by the SANDF be needed for visiting Heads of State the relevant request forms are attached.

Contact Numbers

Waterkloof Airforce Base: VIP Lounge/Movement Control

Capt. O Smith

Tel: 012 672 3433

Fax: 012 672 4739

21 Squadron

Tel: 012 672 3704

Fax: 012 672 3701

Air Transport Requests (ATR)

Officer Commanding: Joint Air Transport:

Tel: 012 312 2334

Fax: 012 312 2929



CHECKLIST FOR CO-ORDINATING AN INCOMING VISIT

Visit : _____

Dates : _____

Project Leader: _____

	Task	Contact Person / Point of Reference	Done	Date Completed
1	Receive notification of visit (DDIR: State Visits) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Written confirmation 2. Inform Chief/Deputy Chief of State Protocol 3. Analyse nature & complexity of visit 4. Appoint Project Leader & Anchorperson 	Political Desk / Resident Mission Policy on incoming international visits		
2	Security <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inform VIP Protection Unit 2. Invite to attend preparatory meetings 3. Obtain contact details of Protector 4. Perform site visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fax template, attach Note Verbale – to be addressed to Director and copied to co-ordinator 		
3	Schedule preparatory meeting <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Date? 2. Time? 3. Venue? (2nd FI Boardroom for large parties) 4. Arrange refreshments 5. Inform & invite role-players: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deputy Chief of State Protocol • Political Desk • Office of the President/ Deputy President • Spousal support • Presidency Protocol & Ceremonial Services • Office of the Minister/Deputy Minister • Media Liaison 6. Agenda 7. At the meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protocol chairs • Get all attendants' contact details • Schedule follow-up meeting • Minutes to be taken & circulated within 48 hours 	Secretary to DcoP (x0314) Supervisor: Gilboa House <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ref: functional list • Relevant desk (ref: functional list) • Private Secretary • Director: Spousal Support • Director: Presidential Protocol • Chief of Staff/Private Secretary • DFA, Office of the President/Deputy President • Ref: functional list • Ref: State Visits: contact details • Ref: State Visits: contact details • Ref: State Visits: contact details • Ref: State Visits: contact details • Ref: State Visits: contact details • Director: DIPP • Manager: SPL • Amend template to suit meeting • Attendance register • Template 		


	Task	Competent Person / Point of Reference	Date	Date completed
	8. After the meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Schedule briefing session with CoP/DcoP should they not have attended 			
4	Accommodation <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Where will the visit be taking place? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> What is the scheduled programme? What is President Mbeki's schedule for that period? Is Parliament in session? Availability of the Diplomatic Guesthouse Status of the visit, i.e. courtesies extended Additional room for VIP Security to booked & allocated as close to the VIP as possible Additional rooms for Protocol officials Early arrival? Reserve the rooms from 1 day prior arrival. Try to negotiate a reduced rate for the pre-registration. Who will receive the VIP upon arrival at the establishment? Very late departures? Can the establishment accommodate this at no extra charge? If no, reserve rooms for either late departure (we shouldn't pay full rate) or until the day after departure (full rate). Submission for approval Copy of all correspondence to ASD: State Gifts & Finance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political Desk Presidency Parliamentary Liaison Manager: Presidential & Diplomatic Guesthouses Policy on incoming international visits Procedure: accommodation 		
5	Transport <ol style="list-style-type: none"> No. of vehicles Class of vehicles Submission to Chief/Deputy Chief of State Protocol for approval Copy of all correspondence to Sasje 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procedure: transport 		
	Firearms <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Weapon details + passport numbers of holders from Resident Mission Fax details to Central Firearms Registry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guidelines: weapon clearances 		

Task	Contact/Person/Point of Reference	Time	Status/Completed
3. Follow up re clearance certificates			
7 Arrival / Departure 1. Arrival & departure details 2. Scheduled or private flight? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scheduled – inform State Protocol Lounge Private – inform relevant air base 3. Flight clearances 4. Entry requirements 5. Arrival ceremony <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Receiving line Military Ceremonial Red carpet Flag Visitor's book 	1. Note Verbale 2. Resident Mission <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fax 011 970 1140 Waterkloof 012 672 3504 Guidelines: Waterkloof Airforce Base Policy on incoming international visits Flag bank 		
8 Gifts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nature of gift List of persons (names & titles) requiring gifts to ASD: State Gifts & Finance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Procedure: state gifts 		
9 Programme <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Obtain an approved draft programme Ensure that format and language is correct Obtain delegation list of visiting country & official RSA delegation Confirm status, participants, venue & order of proceedings for each event Contact organiser of each outside event and conduct site visits with VIP Protection Unit Update programme regularly & forward to Deputy Director for editing prior to circulating to role-players Final programme to be approved by D/CoP Final programme to be approved by DDG of relevant Political Desk prior to printing Final programme to be sent to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presidency Ministry Office of the Director-General Deputy/Chief of State Protocol DDG: Political Desk Operations Room VIP Protection Unit Programmes for State Visits to be printed in booklet form 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political Desk Resident Mission / Political Desk DFA Public Diplomacy (Publications) or GCIS 		
Meeting with Resident Mission / advance team <ol style="list-style-type: none"> An internal preparatory meeting must first have taken place Invite role-players (same as for preparatory 			

	Task	Contact Person / Point of Reference	Date	Date of completion
	meeting plus Resident Mission) 3. Conduct site visits			
11	Note Verbale to Mission <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Courtesies ▪ Guidelines & requirements with regard to logistical arrangements ▪ Contact details of Project Leader ▪ Programme 			
12	Report <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Convene debriefing meeting with all role-players ▪ Compile report ▪ Send electronically with final programme to Deputy Director for inclusion in State Visits Information Centre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Template 		








the dfa

Department
Foreign Affairs
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

**Click Here
to access
Operational Guidelines for Incoming Visits**



**Click Here to access
The Introduction to Operational Guidelines**





Department of Foreign Affairs
Directorate: State Visits

Operational Guidelines for State and Official Visits

The Introduction

State Protocol, through the Directorate: State Visits is the executing agent for all Official Incoming and Outgoing Visits. The objective of State Protocol is to support the Department of Foreign Affairs and other Government Departments to achieve foreign policy objectives and to do so within the realm of "Service Excellence".

In order to achieve the above stated level of performance State Protocol has revolutionised the way in which it conducts business by introducing a systematically designed operational tool.

State Protocol proudly introduce the "The Operational Guidelines for the State Visits", which has been developed to ensure that consistent standardised documentation and approved step by step workflow processes are adhered to at all times. This process ensures that each Protocol Official assigned to a particular visit, methodically coordinates the approaching Visit, by applying the principals of project management throughout the process, ensuring that controls are maintained and risks minimised.

The Purpose

"The Operational Guidelines for State Visits " provides Protocol Officials with precise guidelines throughout the process, covering every aspect of a Visit. Protocol Officials are now able to supply Role-players with approved documented information timeously, ensuring that adherence to the actions required by the each Role-player is accomplished within the specified timeframes.





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Directorate: State Visits

"The Operational Guidelines for State Visits" will support the Officials through the process of conducting State Visits as per the Policies and Order of Precedence as instated; enforcing the governance of the Directorate: State Visits' vision - resulting in the delivery of "Service Excellence".

As Protocol Officials complete each task / checklists, information is directly populated into a reporting graph. At any stage of the project, Seniors and Supervisors are able to access "The Operational Guidelines for State Visits", allowing for measured and managed results which positively contribute and aid in the performance management process of the Branch.

"The Operational Guidelines for State Visits" enables each Protocol Official to operate and execute their assigned projects at an optimal level ensuring that world class standards are achieved and maintained throughout the process.

"Link Back to the Matrix"



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Department of Foreign Affairs
Directorate: State Visits

Work Breakdown Schedule

[Link back to Project Performance Matrix](#)

WBS No.	Description of activity and standards specification applicable	Definition of deliverable to be submitted	Person and/or organisation responsible for activity	Start Date	Completion Date

STATE CAPTURE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY



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WORK BREAKDOWN SCHEDULE

Link back to Project Performance Matrix

WBS No.	Description of activity and standards/specification applicable	Definition of deliverable to be submitted	Person and/or organisation responsible for activity	Start Date	Completion Date
	Obtain / verify status and purpose of visit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Type of visit Reason for visit 	Confirmed status Reasons for visits	Political Desk	Same day	Same day
	Request delegation details <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Name Designation in order of precedence 	Confirmed delegation list / details	Political Desk Foreign Mission	Same day	Same day
	Request for processing of accreditation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Name Designation Details of site visits 	Accreditation cards	NIA	Day of prep meeting	3 Day Intervals
	Request for threat analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Threat Assessment Report 	Threat analysis report	NIA	Day of prep meeting	2 Weeks prior to visit
	Secure Accommodation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5 Star Hotel Presidential Suite Diplomatic – Foreign Minister 	Secured appropriate accommodation	Protocol Officer	Day of prep meeting	5 Days prior to visit

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WBS No.	Description of activity and standards specification applicable	Definition of deliverable to be submitted	Person and/or organisation responsible for activity	Start Date	Completion Date
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Junior Suites – other Ministers and Deputy Ministers <p>Secure Transport</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> S Class (Armoured) – Head of State E Class – Foreign Minister & Spouse C Class and Luggage van Transport Protocol Officer – Camry COP Protocol vehicle – C Class) <p>Request for Metro Police escort</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As per package <p>Request for flight clearances</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Details of aircraft Type of aircraft Registration Call sign Pilot in charge Overnight landing Registration of aircraft Guarding of aircraft <p>Request for weapon & radio clearance/</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Type of weapons 	<p>Secured appropriate transport</p> <p>Appropriate package police escort</p> <p>Valid over-flight and landing clearance certificate</p> <p>Clearance certificate</p>	<p>Protocol Officer</p> <p>Protocol Officer / Metro Police</p> <p>Protocol Officer / SAAF / ACSA</p> <p>Protocol Officer / Border Police / Resident Mission</p>	<p>Day of prep meeting</p> <p>Day of prep meeting</p> <p>Day of prep meeting</p> <p>Day of prep meeting</p>	<p>5 Days prior to visit</p> <p>5 Days subsequent to prep meeting</p> <p>5 Days subsequent to prep meeting</p> <p>5 working days subsequent to prep meeting</p>

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[Link back to Project Performance Matrix](#)

WBS No	Description of activity and standards specification applicable	Definition of deliverable to be submitted	Person and/or organisation responsible for activity	Start Date	Completion Date
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of weapons Details of persons carrying weapons Number of rounds Radio frequency <p>Processing of entry requirements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Visas Passports Inoculations Spraying of aircraft <p>Confirmation of arrival and departure details</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Time Date Place Passenger list <p>Request for State Protocol lounge facilitation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitation of A & B Suites <p>Request for protection and chauffeuring</p>	<p>Ensuring enough officials assigned to facilitate the process</p> <p>Confirmation of arrival and departure</p> <p>Written confirmation of State Protocol lounge facilitation</p> <p>Written</p>	<p>Home Affairs / SARS / Health</p> <p>Protocol Officer / Political Desk & Resident Mission</p> <p>Protocol Officer / State Protocol lounge</p>	<p>Day of prep meeting</p> <p>Day of prep meeting</p> <p>Day of prep meeting</p> <p>Day of prep</p>	<p>5 working days subsequent to prep meeting</p> <p>5 working days subsequent to prep meeting</p> <p>5 working days subsequent to prep meeting</p> <p>5 working days subsequent to prep meeting</p> <p>5 working</p>

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WBS No.	Description of activity and standards/specification applicable	Definition of deliverable to be submitted	Person and/or organisation responsible for activity	Start Date	Completion Date
	of the VVIP / VIP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • VVIP • VIP and accompanying Ministers 	confirmation of the requested protection with the flag info Name & contact details Written confirmation of media details	Protocol Officer / PPU and VIP Protection	meeting	days subsequent to prep meeting
	Request for media coverage <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Photo opportunity • Media release • Interviews • Press Conference 	Confirmation of procurement in accordance to specified standards	Protocol Officer / Public Diplomacy	Day of prep meeting	5 working days subsequent to prep meeting
	Request for appropriate gifts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President and spouse • Chief of Protocol • Protocol Officer (Counterpart) 		Protocol Officer	Day of prep meeting	5 working days subsequent to prep meeting
	Providing information on site visits <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Details of historical sites • Programme for historical site visits • Accommodation • Transport • Meeting venues 	Confirmation of site visits / programme	Protocol Officer / Political Desk / VIP Protection Unit	Day of prep meeting	5 working days subsequent to prep meeting





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WBS No.	Description of activity and standard/s specification applicable	Definition of deliverable to be submitted	Person and/or organisation responsible for activity	Start Date	Completion Date
	<p>Request for special requirements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dietary requirements CV of VVIP Blood group Allergies <p>Request for the programme</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arrival ceremony Welcome ceremony One-on-one / tête-à-tête Bi-lateral meeting / talks Signing of agreements / ceremony Press conference State banquet Visit to historical sites Business seminar <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Receive programme from Desk / DTI Verify the participants from Presidency Departure ceremony 	<p>Written confirmation of special requirements</p> <p>Receipt of draft programme</p>	<p>Protocol Officer / Political Desk / Resident Mission</p> <p>Protocol Officer / Political Desk/Presidency</p>	<p>Day of prep meeting</p> <p>Day of prep meeting</p>	<p>5 working days subsequent to prep meeting</p>

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Matjila, J : Director-General

From: Monyela, TC : DDG : Branch: Public Diplomacy
Sent: 01 May 2013 10:23 AM
To: Mazibuko, P : Office of Minister; Matjila, J : Director-General
Subject: Fwd: Request for Flight Clearances - Indian Delegation

FYI

Sent from my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Matjila, WM Mr : Dir State Visits" <matjilaw@dirco.gov.za>
Date: 01 May 2013 9:14:39 AM SAST
To: "Mason, GJ : Dir State Visits" <MasonG@dirco.gov.za>
Cc: "Monyela, TC : DDG : Branch: Public Diplomacy" <MonyelaTC@dirco.gov.za>
Subject: FW: Request for Flight Clearances - Indian Delegation

Dear Ms Mason

Mam this is the only message that i have received from AMB Koloane. please see meesage below.

Kind regards

William

From: Matjila, WM Mr : Dir State Visits
Sent: 30 April 2013 10:53 PM
To: Mdledle, N : Dir State Visits
Subject: FW: Request for Flight Clearances - Indian Delegation

Dear Noba

Please see message below for your information.

Regards
 William

From: Matjila, WM Mr : Dir State Visits
Sent: 09 April 2013 08:57 AM
To: 'saafoverflights'
Cc: Kobue, JR : Dir State Visits; Mokgakala, K : Deputy Chief of Protocol; Nkosi, NB: Dir State Visits; Maanzo, S : Deputy Chief of Protocol; Mbuyane, M Ms : Dir State Visits; Rakgwadi, SM Mr : Dir State Visits; Morris, M Ms : Office of DDG : State Protocol
Subject: FW: Request for Flight Clearances - Indian Delegation

Dear Colleagues

Please see message below for your urgent assistance and information.

Kind regards

Mr William Matjila
 Department of International Relations and Cooperation
 Directorate: State Visits
 OR Tambo Building
 460 Soutpansberg Road
 Rietondale
 Pretoria
 0084
 Tel: 012 301 8508
 Fax: 012 329 1534
 Cell: 079 699 5774
 email: matjilaw@dirco.gov.za



international relations
 & cooperation

Department
 International Relations and Cooperation
 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



From: Morris, M Ms : Office of DDG : State Protocol **On Behalf Of** Koloane, V : Office of DDG : State Protocol

Sent: 09 April 2013 08:33 AM

To: Matjila, WM Mr : Dir State Visits

Cc: Mason, GJ : Dir State Visits; Ramokgopa, S Ms : Deputy Chief of State Protocol

Subject: Request for Flight Clearances - Indian Delegation

Dear William

As per your discussion with Ambassador Koloane with regards to the request for flight clearances and landing at Waterkloof AFB for the Indian Delegation, kindly note that Amb Koloane telephonically approved the request.

Regards,